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INTRODUCTION
Recently I learned that one of my former students, a very
bright and likeable young man who had become a partner at a
major New York law firm, was leaving that firm to start his own
more specialized practice. He believed that the field of law he
had chosen to specialize in was likely to grow enormously in the
near future. It was one that most large firms had neither the
expertise nor desire to engage in, and where he felt that establishing a good reputation at any early stage would provide a competitive advantage. He intended to specialize in advising businesses engaged in the production and sale of cannabis products.
Intrigued, I invited him to come back to the law school and discuss his new venture before a student audience. In many ways,
his presentation was similar to that of any other lawyer leaving
a big firm to go out on their own. He talked about the problem of
controlling overhead costs, client acquisition and retention, relationships between partners, etc. At one point, however, almost
as an aside, he noted, “of course, from a certain perspective, everything we do is a violation of the law.”
While the issues facing those practicing cannabis law are in
some respects unique, the problem of counseling firms with business models involving deliberate and repeated violations of the
law is certainly not. Many of the most prominent “new economy”
companies, including Uber and Airbnb, pursue business strategies designed to give them a competitive edge by deliberately ig-
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noring the regulatory restrictions the law imposes on other companies that might be deemed their competitors.1 In this regard,
Uber claims it is not operating a taxi or limousine service, but it
is merely an app that facilitates ride sharing by independent
contractor drivers.2 Airbnb argues that it merely enables homeowners to share their residences with paying guests and therefore is not subject to the regulations governing hotel or accommodation booking services.3 These claims are often legally
dubious and have been rejected by courts and regulatory bodies.4
Nonetheless, such companies continue to pursue their illegal
business practices, hoping that their popularity among consumers will lead to few or no sanctions for their violations or, better
yet, changes in the law.5 In doing so, they are pursuing a strategy of legal risk management. They treat the risk of adverse legal consequences as similar to financial and business risks, seeking to quantify both their likelihood and potential penalties, to
reduce them if possible, and to determine whether the potential
benefits to the firm justify those risks.6 This requires the advice
of lawyers, who are expected to opine as to the likely costs, dangers, and effectiveness of various strategies involved in evading
or violating the law.7
Advising such businesses raises serious ethical issues for
conscientious lawyers. The basic guidance is set forth in Rule
1.2(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which
states that “[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or
assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent . . . .”8 The Rule draws a sharp distinction between
1. See infra notes 200–11, 238–47, and accompanying text.
2. See infra notes 199–203 and accompanying text.
3. Airbnb makes a colorable argument that these regulations are
preempted by a federal statute, but this argument has been rejected by a number of federal courts. See infra notes 236–57 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 203–11, 255–61, and accompanying text.
5. See Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 SO. CALIF. L. REV. 383, 386 (2017) (“Uber and many other businesses
are built around and based upon a plan to change the law—and, in some instances, to simply break the law in the meantime.”); see also Elizabeth Pollman,
Corporate Disobedience, 68 DUKE L.J. 709, 712–13 (2019).
6. See infra notes 93, 126–29, and accompanying text.
7. Pollman and Barry refer to this strategy as “regulatory entrepreneurship.” Pollman & Barry, supra note 5.
8. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). In
New York, the equivalent ethics rule prohibits advising or assisting with respect
to conduct that is “illegal or fraudulent.” N.Y. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
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past and prospective client activities. If Vito Corleone is indicted
for drug smuggling and conducting a racketeering enterprise,
there is nothing in the Rules that would prevent an ethical criminal lawyer from providing him with a vigorous legal defense.
However, if Vito Corleone asks a corporate lawyer to set up some
shell companies through which he can more easily operate his
drug smuggling and racketeering enterprises, an ethical corporate lawyer would have to politely decline.9 The Rule prohibits
such assistance even though the legal work involved is quite routine when performed for a client not planning to use the corporate form for criminal purposes.10
In many circumstances, the distinction created by Rule 1.2
is sensible and easily justified. Providing a legal defense to a client for past criminal activity safeguards important principles
and is unlikely to cause serious societal harm. Advising and assisting prospective criminal conduct violates the lawyer’s basic
commitment to the rule of law.11 It turns the lawyer into an accomplice of sorts, helping to make the client’s socially harmful
conduct more effective and harder to detect.12 Moreover, it tends
to diminish the already low public reputation of the legal profession.13 Rule 1.2(d) makes it clear that the only advice lawyers

r. 1.2(d) (N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N 2018). The definition of “illegal” conduct in that
context is unclear but may include intentional torts. Lewis Tesser & Timothy
Nolen, “Illegal” Conduct Under Rule 1.2: When Does Advice to a Client Violate
an Attorney’s Ethical Obligations?, N.Y. LEGAL ETHICS REP. (Apr. 2015)
http://www.newyorklegalethics.com/illegal-conduct-under-rule-1-2-when-does
-advice-to-a-client-violate-an-attorneys-ethical-obligations/
[https://perma.cc/XX8A-MDLT].
9. Presumably very politely.
10. This Article focuses on ethical issues, not criminal liability, but there
have been situations in which advising clients has led to criminal or civil
charges of aiding and abetting liability against lawyers, or at least consideration
of such charges. See Matthew A. Smith, Advice and Complicity, 60 DUKE L.J.
499, 516–17 (2010) (discussing potential criminal liability of lawyers for advising in the Enron, Lincoln Savings, and other situations); see also, Vince Farhat
& Calon Russell, “Houston, We Have a Problem”: Clients Who Engage in Unlawful Conduct During Your Representation, WHITE COLLAR CRIME COMMITTEE
NEWSL., Winter/Spring 2015, at 1.
11. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING § 22.2 (3d ed. 2009) (“[L]awyers contribute to the peaceful running
of a lawful society by advising their clients what the law is, and by carrying out
their client’s wishes within the bounds of law.”).
12. See id.
13. See infra notes 304–07 and accompanying text.
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should give regarding prospective criminal conduct should be to
help clients determine whether such conduct violates the law.14
Accordingly, different ethical standards apply to lawyers advising business clients from those engaged in criminal defense
work. Criminal lawyers can raise all but the most blatantly frivolous or fraudulent arguments in defense of their clients knowing that the court will ultimately adjudicate their merits or lack
thereof.15 The corporate lawyer, in contrast, is expected to determine whether a client’s proposed conduct is criminal or fraudulent.16 If so, the lawyer must advise the client of that fact and
then refrain from further assistance.17 Failure to do so would not
only be an ethical violation but could subject the lawyer to serious adverse consequences, including criminal or tort liability.18
Problems arise when Rule 1.2 is applied to lawyers advising
clients who operate at the “edge” of criminality, or the “not-quitelegal.”19 My former student, the cannabis lawyer, is well aware
that the businesses he advises are selling a product that constitutes a Schedule 1 “controlled substance” under federal law and
that, constitutionally speaking, federal law preempts countervailing state laws. Yet he is also aware that many states have
passed laws that purport to legalize the sale and use of cannabis
products, and there have been little or no efforts to enforce prohibitions on cannabis-related businesses. Moreover, he truly believes that the trend in the law is towards full and complete legalization, and, within a few years, sale and production of
cannabis products will be as legal as sale and production of alcohol. Similarly, when lawyers representing Uber, Airbnb, and
similar companies help develop business plans which violate
various state and municipal laws,20 they can justify their actions
14. “[A] lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course
of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good faith
effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
15. See id. r. 3.1.
16. See id. r. 2.1.
17. See id. r. 1.16 cmt.; see also Smith, supra note 10, at 507 (“[T]he systemic protections afforded by the adversarial process disappear in the context
of the lawyer’s advising role, since no opposing counsel or neutral arbiter acts
as a check on partisan representation.”).
18. See infra notes 183–89 and accompanying text.
19. Pollman and Barry call this “taking advantage of legal gray areas,”
while noting that for disruptive businesses this is often indistinguishable from
“breaking the law.” Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 398–99.
20. Many of the regulatory violations of companies like Uber and Airbnb
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by claiming: (1) that the services they are providing are popular
with the general public; (2) that the laws they are violating are
old, outdated, and not frequently or consistently enforced; and
(3) that, in the near future, the laws will likely be changed to
make the services their companies provide clearly and unambiguously legal.21
Yet neither lack of enforcement nor likelihood of future
changes in the law provide any ground under the Model Rules
for counseling or assisting the violation of a criminal law. Accordingly, the conduct of these lawyers poses a dilemma both for
themselves and the legal order. While the criminal prosecution
or disbarment of such lawyers is unlikely,22 it is not impossible.
Most lawyers would certainly prefer to conduct their business
without any such threats hanging over their heads. Somewhat
more troubling is the possibility that lawyers’ criminal or ethical
violations might be used against them in other disputes. For ex-

are misdemeanors at best, carrying only the danger of minor financial penalties.
See Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 417–18 (noting that regulatory entrepreneurs are often willing to pay a “civil fine” but avoid violating criminal laws that
might lead to “incarceration of the executives.”). Unlike cannabis, where the
activity involves a federal felony and potential incarceration, it is reasonable to
ask whether regulatory violations by companies like Uber and Airbnb, where
the potential criminal penalties are mostly minor financial ones, should be considered “criminal” within the meaning of Rule 1.2. See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of
Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1548 (1995) (questioning the coherence of the
Model Rules’ distinction between criminal and civil violations). Yet violation of
any criminal law raises both practical and ethical concerns for corporate lawyers. The practical concern is not actual criminal prosecution or disbarment, but
the creation of a worrying argument about their unethical conduct that might
be used against them in private litigation, for example, to deny malpractice insurance coverage or the protection of the attorney-client privilege. There is no
indication in the language of Rule 1.2 itself or any official comments that it is
limited to felonies or other “serious” crimes. Moreover, as an ethical matter, it
is hard to say which violations of criminal laws do not have serious moral consequences. If the violation of driver licensing requirements or premises inspections by Uber and Airbnb create serious dangers to public safety, who is to say
those violations are minor? Finally, as applied to corporations, who cannot be
jailed, all potential penalties are financial penalties (except perhaps for the risk
of dissolution). With startup companies having billions of dollars potentially at
stake, who is to say which criminal acts might be financially worth taking?
21. Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 400–10.
22. Mike France, Close the Lawyer Loophole, BUS. WKLY., Feb. 2, 2004, at
70 (“Corporate lawyers are almost never sent to jail for helping out white-collar
criminals.”).
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ample, opposing litigants might seek to deny their client communications the protection of the attorney-client privilege.23 Malpractice insurers could refuse to pay on their policies.24 For society generally, and particularly the lawyers within it, the
existence of a large number of respectable and well-regarded
lawyers who are consistently advising and assisting their clients
to violate the law poses even more fundamental questions. Can
such legal representation be justified, or at least tolerated, or
will it lead to erosion of respect for the law and even greater disrespect for the legal profession? Would prohibiting companies
like Uber and Airbnb from formulating legal risk management
plans with the aid of lawyers lead to fewer legal violations or
more, and should that be the major concern? Can a principled
line be drawn between the blatantly illegal and the not-quitelegal, with different consequences for counseling the latter rather than the former?25
Those questions, and others, are explored in this Article.
Part I examines the changing role of corporate counsel over time
to understand how lawyers have come to be seen as potential
accomplices in client criminal conduct. Part I describes how corporate lawyers, once seen as arbiters of appropriate business
conduct for their clients, have had their role gradually narrowed
to that of legal technician, solving legal problems to advance client interests. In the current and more complex legal environment, with the advent of new “disruptive” business strategies,
the corporate lawyer’s role appears to be shifting again, as many

23. Such damaging consequences have been invoked in articles warning
lawyers against advising cannabis businesses. See, e.g., Bruce E. Reinhart,
Dazed and Confused—Legal and Ethical Pitfalls in Marijuana Law, 31 CRIM.
JUST. 4, 4, 8 (2017) (explaining that the consequences to representing cannabis
businesses includes no liability insurance coverage and the fee could be subject
to forfeiture).
24. See id.
25. There is a salutary tradition in much academic work on legal ethics to
focus not just on the minimum standards prescribed by ethics rules, but to conduct a broader normative inquiry as to what lawyers should do in various circumstances not only to avoid punishment, but to advance the welfare of the
profession and society at large and to be true to defensible moral principles. In
that sense, the goals of this Article are similar to those stated by Stephen Pepper in his seminal article on a related ethical question: “(1) to provide guidance
for lawyers in working with their clients in these situations and (2) to explore
some of the difficult underlying questions of both law and lawyering entailed by
the effort to provide that guidance.” Pepper, supra note 20, at 1549.
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are asked to advise with respect to client business conduct that
deliberately violates criminal law.26
Part II takes a closer look at three different businesses
whose activities all raise serious issues for the existing ethical
framework. The cannabis industry represents a particular type
of not-quite-legal conduct. The formal prohibition on the activity
is clear, but there are many contrary objective manifestations of
popular and even governmental support for the activities involved, as well as stated policies of non-enforcement at the federal level.27 As many state ethics commissions have concluded,
current cannabis regulation provides a compelling case for loosening the prohibitions of Rule 1.2(d) to permit lawyers to advise
and assist clients in this almost-legal environment.28 Uber, in
contrast, provides a sobering example of the dangers of legal risk
management. The company’s self-image as a disruptor with little
concern for legal rules helped create an environment that encompassed not just disregard of local regulations, but other illegal
activities no conscientious lawyer could ethically advise or assist.29 Airbnb appears to represent an intermediate case.
Shielded in part by a federal statute which it can argue preempts
local laws, Airbnb has conducted a litigation campaign against
such local regulations as it tries to build market share and popular support to explicitly legalize its business model.30 Its strategy seems to be to violate the law only when absolutely necessary
while seeking to negotiate new mutually acceptable rules of conduct with regulatory authorities.31 Uber and Airbnb demonstrate that any change in the ethical rules to permit lawyers to
assist and advise businesses engaged in not-quite-legal conduct
must also contain clear and reasonable limits on the kinds of
conduct encompassed by such a change.
Part III takes on the fundamental normative issues raised
by contemporary changes in law and businesses practices. Part
26. This Article focuses on the ethical concerns of lawyers, particularly corporate lawyers advising their clients on conduct that violates the law. A related
but quite distinct problem is whether corporate managers may, consistent with
their fiduciary duty, cause their companies to violate the law. That is a question
of corporate law, not ethics, and has been the subject of considerable debate
among corporate law scholars. See Pollman, supra note 5, at 724–28.
27. See discussion infra Part II.A.
28. See infra notes 168–72 and accompanying text.
29. See discussion infra Part II.B.
30. See infra notes 236–61 and accompanying text.
31. See discussion infra Part II.C.

2019]

LAWYER AS ACCOMPLICE

317

III seeks to delineate appropriate ethical considerations for lawyers advising clients whose conduct is not just legally uncertain
but actually violates the formal strictures of criminal law. These
are not easy questions. Powerful arguments can be made for preserving Model Rule 1.2(d)’s current strict prohibition on any aid
or assistance to criminal conduct, particularly when the client’s
primary purpose is just to increase its profits.32 Yet I argue that
overall, both the legal profession and contemporary society will
be better off if corporate lawyers are permitted to advise and assist on certain discrete forms of not-quite-legal conduct. Such advice and assistance should be limited to conduct that: (1) is part
of a law reform effort with an objectively reasonable likelihood
of success; (2) involves only activities that are public and not concealed in any way; and (3) the client itself has determined,
through a committee of independent directors, that the proposed
activities are ethically justified.
I. A BRIEF AND NOT ENTIRELY DEPRESSING HISTORY
OF CORPORATE LAWYERING
The first law firms engaged in a distinctively “corporate”
practice emerged in America at the turn of the twentieth century.33 Since then, both the work of corporate lawyers and the
conception of their appropriate role have gone through a number
of changes. The earliest corporate lawyers viewed themselves as
statesmen-liaisons between popular government and the giant
corporate entities that were increasingly dominating the American economy.34 They saw their job as not just to advance corporate interests but to shape those interests by counseling their
clients to accept reasonable and politically popular governmental constraints on their actions.35 Such a role presumed a substantial degree of autonomy by corporate counsel as well as relative equality of lawyer and client. It also presupposed a
different ethic for lawyers whose primary role was advising corporations rather than litigating on their behalf. Not zealous advocacy, but a deep understanding of the long-term best interests
of the corporate client, of the broader needs of American society,
and a good faith effort to reconcile the two, were the hallmarks
32. See discussion infra Part III.B.
33. See infra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.
34. See discussion infra Part I.A.
35. Such governmental constraints included laws relating to occupational
safety, anticompetitive practices, and rights to unionize. See infra notes 54–57
and accompanying text.
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of elite corporate counsel.36 Later in the century, a more instrumental view of the role of the corporate lawyer became dominant. As corporate conduct was increasingly constrained by complex regulatory structures and litigation threats, corporate
lawyers began to market and see themselves as “problem solvers,” possessing technical expertise in both law and business
that enabled them to resolve business problems in cost effective
and legally defensible ways.37 The distinction between counseling and advocacy became narrowed as lawyers developed innovative business or financial strategies of uncertain legality
which subsequently had to be defended vigorously in litigation.38
Meanwhile, the status and self-conception of the corporate lawyer was diminished from trusted counselor to legal technician.
Accordingly, the history of corporate lawyering is frequently presented as a story of lawyers’ decline—in status, power, and ethical responsibility—if not in wealth.39
This history, while factually accurate, is a little too bleak
and lacks nuance. First, the concept of the lawyer-statesman as
liaison between corporate and broader public interests was always more of an ideal than a reality. Even the most ethical and

36. See infra notes 52–57 and accompanying text.
37. See discussion infra Part I.B.
38. See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
39. See Robert W. Gordon, The American Legal Profession, 1870–2000, in 3
THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND
AFTER (1920– ) 73, 101 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008)
[hereinafter Gordon, Legal Profession]; Robert W. Gordon, The Citizen Lawyer—
A Brief Informal History of a Myth with Some Basis in Reality, 50 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1169, 1178 (2009) [hereinafter Gordon, Citizen Lawyer]. Professor Gordon has provided the most important historical accounts of the ideal of the corporate lawyer as statesman and its decline. While recognizing all the difficulties
of application and the hypocrisies of the lawyers who embraced it, he has still
found it a useful vehicle for criticizing more instrumental contemporary conceptions of the role of corporate lawyer. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, Corporate Law
Practice as a Public Calling, 49 MD. L. REV. 255, 256–57 (1990) [hereinafter
Gordon, Corporate Law Practice]; Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (1988) [hereinafter Gordon, Independence of Lawyers]. Others have also attributed some current problems of the profession to
the decline of the lawyer as statesman model. See JAMES C. FOSTER, THE IDEOLOGY OF APOLITICAL POLITICS: THE ELITE LAWYERS’ RESPONSE TO THE LEGITIMATION CRISIS IN AMERICAN CAPITALISM: 1870–1920, at 136–41 (1986). See
generally ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993) (stating that the decline of the lawyer-statesmen is the root cause of modern problems in the legal
profession).
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socially minded of corporate lawyers found it difficult to effectuate in practice.40 The emerging role of legal technician, on the
other hand, better comported with the nature of law and corporate legal practice in the late twentieth century. The rise of the
regulatory state required expert legal technicians who understood their clients’ business and could provide specific and detailed legal advice on how to achieve business goals while minimizing potential legal and regulatory problems.41 While the
lawyer-statesmen were frequently guardians of the social as well
as legal status quo, the new lawyer technicians were frequently
innovators whose new approaches to law were developed on behalf of groups like corporate raiders and activist investors, many
of whom would have been excluded from the circle of socially approved clients in earlier days.42 Finally, even in their “technician” role, corporate lawyers will usually counsel their clients to
avoid business strategies that may cause substantial injury to
other societal groups or violate strong government policies.43 Rather than cautioning against such policies on ethical or social
grounds, however, they are more likely to say they are seeking
to avoid unnecessary litigation or reduce legal and regulatory
risk.44
Appreciating the value of the lawyer as technician model
also enables us to appreciate the ways in which it is currently
under threat, the threat that is a focus of this Article. Corporate
lawyers are increasingly being asked not only how to accomplish
business objectives by legal means, but how to avoid detection or
serious sanctions of business activities that are likely to be held
to be violations of law, often criminal law.45 This new and uncomfortable role of “lawyer as accomplice” reflects several recent
developments. The growth of compliance departments, as well as
greater awareness by management of the need to quantify and
minimize corporate risk, has led to increased interest in “legal
risk management.”46 Changes in policies and allocation of resources to enforcement also make it increasingly difficult to determine exactly what activities still violate the law and which

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See infra notes 58–74 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part I.B.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text; discussion infra Parts I.A–B.
See infra notes 102–14 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 110–14 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 126–29 and accompanying text.
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have been effectively “decriminalized” by nonenforcement.47 Advising on these matters presents conscientious corporate lawyers
with complex new dilemmas and little realistic guidance from
the Model Rules.
A. THE CORPORATE LAWYER AS STATESMAN
The modern corporate lawyer was a product of the early
twentieth century. Although some lawyer-statesmen of earlier
eras like Alexander Hamilton and Abraham Lincoln had corporations as clients,48 such businesses were not the primary focus
of their practice, and their legal services consisted mostly of litigation advocacy, not counseling and advice.49 By 1900, corporate
practice had become dominated by firms like that of Paul D. Cravath, “an independent multispecialty firm that served exclusively corporate clients.”50 Lawyers at such firms presented and
47. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing how these issues have affected
the cannabis business).
48. See Paul Finkelman, Alexander Hamilton, Esq.: Founding Father as
Lawyer, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 229, 246 (1984) (stating Hamilton was “on
retainer for the United Insurance Company and the Bank of New York . . . .”);
John S. Skilton, Abraham Lincoln: A Lawyer “For the Ages,” 2011 WIS. L. REV.
1, 6 (2011) (noting Lincoln and his partners represented railroad lines in seventy-one cases but opposed them in sixty-two others).
49. See Gordon, Legal Profession, supra note 39, at 92–93; see also William
H. Rehnquist, The Lawyer-Statesman in American History, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 537, 554–57 (1986).
50. Gordon, Legal Profession, supra note 39, at 93; see Wayne K. Hobson,
Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large Law Firm, 1870–1915, in
THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA 19–20 (Gerard
W. Gawalt ed., 1984) (discussing the growth of the Cravath firm). Such firms
were considered the “pinnacle” of the legal profession, and recruited potential
new partners from the top law schools. Gordon, Legal Profession, supra note 39,
at 93 (noting that their recruiting was “largely restricted to white Protestant
males”). Much of their transactional work was fairly routine and boring—title
searches, blue sky compliance, drafting trust indentures and other complex financing instruments. Id. The most senior corporate partners at such firms, however, also assumed a more exalted role as counselors to top corporate management. Id. What these elite lawyers mostly provided to their clients were
connections. They acted as “brokers and fixers,” introducing industrial firms to
sources of finance capital and linking sellers of American equity and debt securities to potential buyers in the U.S and abroad. Id. at 94–95. They also functioned as liaisons between corporate America and various government officials.
Id. They tried to prevent regulatory interference with their clients’ business,
but also sought governmental favors such as, “concessions, franchises, tax exemptions, subsidies, regulatory loopholes, monopoly rights, and public-works
contracts.” Id. at 94. Since the most successful corporate lawyers were likely to
be the most effective providers of such services, it behooved these lawyers to
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likely viewed themselves as socially and intellectually equal to
the corporate leaders they counseled, if not superior.51 As such,
they functioned as intermediaries of a sort between the rougheredged industrialists of the Gilded Age and an older political elite
that was worried about labor unrest, anticompetitive practices,
threats to public health and safety, and other evils associated
with the new corporate giants.52 These corporate lawyers assumed the traditional lawyerly American role of statesmen,
seeking to reconcile the interests of corporate America with
broader public concerns.53 They announced their support for
such items of the progressive agenda as occupational safety, antitrust laws, and rights to unionize, and urged their clients to
accept such innovative developments in general.54 Yet they also
sought to advance their clients’ business interests by publicly
supporting appointment of business-sympathetic regulators,
limitations on antitrust enforcement and centrist union managements willing to partner with big business.55 These lawyers were
not merely seeking compromise for compromise sake, they were
setting forth a coherent, and to them, quite attractive, vision of
an American future in which well-managed and well-regulated
industrialization would provide a better life for all.56 This was a
vision that these lawyers sought to effectuate both in their private roles as corporate counsel but also in the public political
sphere as cabinet members and in other important government
roles.57
cultivate their networks and connections in the world of finance, government
and communications.
51. They were likely to be more educated, more worldly and better integrated into the social, economic, and political elites of their respective communities. See Gordon, Legal Profession, supra note 39, at 94–95.
52. See id. at 92–96.
53. See Gordon, Citizen Lawyer, supra note 39, at 1193; Hobson, supra note
50 at 4.
54. See Gordon, Citizen Lawyer, supra note 39, at 1192–93; Gordon, Legal
Profession, supra note 39, at 95–96.
55. See Gordon, Citizen Lawyer, supra note 39, at 1192–93; Gordon, Legal
Profession, supra note 39, at 95–96.
56. See Gordon, Legal Profession, supra note 39, at 98.
57. Gordon describes the worldviews of these corporate lawyers who became actual statesmen:
In many respects, their roles in office were their private roles writ
large—making the state, nation, and world a congenial environment
for American capitalism. Eastern corporate lawyers—Elihu Root,
Charles Evans Hughes, James Coolidge Carter, Henry Stimson, Russell Leffingwell, William J. Donovan, Dean Acheson, and John Foster
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Progressives like Louis D. Brandeis saw corporate lawyers
as potential allies in their battles for more effective regulation of
big business.58 Brandeis was not a corporate lawyer in the manner of Cravath, but he did represent corporate clients in his private practice.59 It is significant, therefore, that in his famous
1905 address to the Harvard Ethical Society,60 he described the
profession of a corporate lawyer as one that presented “unusual
opportunities for usefulness.”61 The “opportunity” he urged on
Harvard students was to reconcile management with labor, constrain industrial power through enlightened regulation, and to
do so in a peaceful manner that avoided domestic strife.62 The
call was an ethical one, and it presupposed that these Harvard
students would someday be in positions to effectuate such reconciliation between corporate interests and progressive values.
Dulles—dominated high foreign policy posts in the first half of the
twentieth century. The policies of such men generally reflected the interests of their business clienteles: a peaceful, prosperous, and economically reconstructed Europe; the use of military and diplomatic power
to promote stable governments reliably committed to promoting and
protecting foreign direct investment and payment of foreign debts; and
a system of international treaties and arbitration to enforce transnational contracts and settle international disputes. To be sure, such lawyer-statesmen were much more than tools for clients: their vision was
often broader, more cosmopolitan, and more farsighted in anticipating
that compromises would have to be made for the sake of industrial
peace.
Id. at 96.
58. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS: A LIFE 300–26 (2009), for
a discussion on Brandeis’ progressivism and attitudes toward big business. Biographical accounts of Brandeis have been described as “rang[ing] from the admiring to the hagiographical.” John Braeman, “The People’s Lawyer” Revisited:
Louis D. Brandeis Versus the United Shoe Machinery Company, 50 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 284, 285 n.5 (2008). See Thomas K. McCraw, Louis D. Brandeis Reappraised, 54 AM. SCHOLAR 525, 525 (1985), for argument from one of the few
dissenters.
59. See generally Philip Cullis, The Limits of Progressivism: Louis
Brandeis, Democracy and the Corporation, 30 J. AM. STUD. 381 (1996) (discussing the various corporate clients Brandeis represented).
60. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, The Opportunity in the Law (May 4, 1905), in BUSINESS—A PROFESSION 313 (1914).
61. He acknowledged that some contemporary lawyers had become “mercenary” due to corporate interests’ willingness “to pay vast sums for questionable
services.” Id. He reserved his main criticism for lawyers who advocated publicly
for legislation on behalf of private corporations without taking any account of
the broader public interest, which he saw as an improper extension of the lawyer’s advocacy role. Id.
62. Id.
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This was not an easy balancing act to pull off. Brandeis’ own
controversial representation of the United Shoe Machinery Co.
illustrates the problems and limitations of the ideal of the corporate lawyer-statesman.63 Brandeis had become a director of the
company at the request of some important clients.64 In that role,
he publicly testified before the Massachusetts legislature
against a bill that would have prohibited the anticompetitive tying arrangements on which the company’s business model was
based.65 The bill was defeated, but a few months later, Brandeis
resigned his directorship.66

63. See UROFSKY, supra note 58, at 310–17. See generally Braeman, supra
note 58 (discussing Brandeis’ history with United Shoe Machinery Company).
64. Brandeis had a longstanding relationship with the Henderson family,
principal shareholders of the McKay Shoe Machinery Company. UROFSKY, supra note 58, at 310. When McKay, along with a number of other companies,
combined to form the United Shoe Machinery Company, Brandeis agreed to represent it on some matters and also became a director. See id. at 310–11. The
combined entity owned patents covering almost all the critical equipment
needed for the manufacture of shoes. Id. at 310. It provided these patents to
shoe manufacturers through restrictive leases which made it virtually impossible for shoe manufacturers to deal with any other equipment suppliers and gave
United Shoe a market share of “near total monopoly proportions.” Braeman,
supra note 58, at 290.
65. See Clyde Spillenger, Elusive Advocate: Reconsidering Brandeis as People’s Lawyer, 105 YALE L.J. 1445, 1519–20 (1996); Braeman, supra note 58, at
291. While such tying agreements were controversial and increasingly criticized, they were not clearly illegal at the time. It was also apparently important
to Brandeis to note that he was not speaking as “counsel” for the company.
Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1520. Brandeis argued that as the patent holder
on some shoe manufacturing equipment, United Shoe had a right to its dominant market position, and that because of it, United Shoe was able to provide
better service and lower equipment prices to the many shoe manufacturers who
were its customers. See Braeman, supra note 58, at 291–92. There is some debate whether these arguments represented Brandeis’ actual views at the time
he made them. Brandeis said that they did, and that he later changed his views.
Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1519.
66. See Braeman, supra note 58, at 292; Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1520.
The reasons for his resignation are unclear. He told United Shoe’s President
that because the company was so successful, he felt he no longer needed to stay
on the board to protect the interests of the Hendersons, his original clients, and
also complained that he lacked influence over company policy as only one member of a nineteen-member board. See Braemen, supra note 58, at 294. Yet he
acknowledged to others that his views concerning the legality of United Shoe’s
business practices were changing. See id. at 294–95. A third factor was a potential conflict with Brandeis’ representation of a number of large shoe manufacturers, who were a more important part of his practice and had begun to complain about United Shoe’s lease contracts. See id. at 292–94. Brandeis was
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For the next few years, Brandeis made no public statements
concerning United Shoe. In 1910, however, he began to speak out
publicly against United Shoe’s business practices.67 This
prompted a firestorm of criticism accusing Brandeis of disloyalty
to former clients and unethical conflicts of interest.68 It was a
major point raised by opponents of his nomination to the Supreme Court.69
The United Shoe example suggests that the problem with
the lawyer-statesman ideal was not simply the failure of corporate lawyers to adopt it. There were conceptual difficulties with
the ideal itself. One was dealing with the legal and moral uncertainties of real-world business practices. Brandeis was likely ambivalent about United Shoe’s business practices when he publicly defended them in 1906.70 United Shoe’s practices were not
clearly illegal nor, to his mind, immoral, and they had certainly
made United Shoe immensely successful.71 In such instances, a
corporate lawyer might be expected to resolve such uncertainties
as Brandeis did, interpreting the law in accordance with his client’s best interests. This example also illustrates the inherent
conflicts in seeking to be both a private representative of clients
and a public advocate for broader social values. Brandeis’ prior
advocacy of United Shoe’s interests in public fora made it difficult for him to later publicly express his own personal and differing views without encountering substantial criticism for unethical conduct toward a former client.72 To the extent the
instrumental in getting United Shoe to engage in negotiations with those manufacturers regarding possible changes in the equipment leases. See id. at 294–
95; Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1520.
67. Acting on behalf of a consortium of shoe manufacturers, he testified before Congressional committees and federal agencies concerning United Shoe’s
“flagrant” anticompetitive practices, even condemning the initial mergers that
created United Shoe as a violation of the Sherman Act. See Braeman, supra note
58, at 295–96; Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1520. The reasons for the change
were again a mix of public and private motives. Antitrust policy was an increasingly important part of political debates. See Braeman, supra note 58, at 296.
New case law had helped change Brandeis’ mind as to the legality of tying arrangements, and he was incensed over United Shoe’s treatment of a potential
competitor, the very company that had unsuccessfully tried to hire Brandeis a
few years previously. See id. at 295–96; Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1520.
68. Braeman, supra note 58, at 295–99.
69. UROFSKY, supra note 58, at 450–51.
70. Braeman, supra note 58, at 291–92.
71. Id.
72. Spillenger calls this “the dilemma of private action in the public
sphere.” Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1521.
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lawyer-statesman model entails an obligation to speak out publicly on important political, social, and economic concerns, it may
simply be incompatible with representation of private corporate
interests relevant to those concerns.73 It is also doubtful that
elite corporate lawyers could simply persuade clients that it was
in their long-term best interests to modify corporate practices
toward more socially beneficial goals.74 Brandeis’ inability to
achieve any meaningful modifications of the United Shoe tying
contracts in negotiations illustrates the difficulties of asking corporate clients to curb their profit-maximizing behavior to
achieve better long-term relationships with their customers.
Not at all coincidentally, the early twentieth century also
saw a professionalization of lawyering through the growth of bar
associations and new emphasis on professional ethics. The elite
corporate law firms were in the forefront of this movement.75
One of their major accomplishments was the 1908 adoption by
the American Bar Association of the first Canons of Professional
Ethics.76 Although much ethical criticism had been aimed at
elite lawyers at corporate firms, the ABA committee that drafted
the Canons was largely composed of lawyers from such firms,77

73. Brandeis was able to avoid this dilemma in many instances by “guiding”
his clients to solutions to their business problems that comported with his social
values and by establishing his independence as a public figure free to take public positions inconsistent with potential client interests. See Gordon, Independence of Lawyers, supra note 39, at 27, 32–33; Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1510,
1522–24. As the United Shoe situation illustrates, even Brandeis was unable to
maintain that balancing act in all circumstances, and it is unlikely that even
the most prestigious corporate lawyers could have the same influence on and
independence from client interests today.
74. Spillenger, supra note 65, at 1510–22.
75. See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2406 (2003).
76. See generally id. (describing each Canon and its meaning in detail).
77. Id. at 2462 n.365. The Canons were a response to the criticism, most
notably by President Theodore Roosevelt, that the legal profession, particularly
its “most influential and most highly remunerated members,” had abandoned
independent ethical standards in order to help their corporate clients “evade the
laws which are made to regulate in the interest of the public the use of great
wealth.” THEODORE ROOSEVELT, The Harvard Spirit (June 28, 1905), in IV
PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESSES AND STATE PAPERS 407, 419–20 (1910); accord Altman, supra note 75, at 2406–09. Brandeis had made similar allegations in his
speech to the Harvard Ethical Society. See Brandeis, supra note 60, at 323 (stating that the bar has “not only failed to take part in constructive legislation designed to solve in the public interest our great social, economic and industrial
problems, but they have failed likewise to oppose legislation prompted by selfish
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and the Canons mostly targeted other types of lawyers.78 The
Canons said relatively little about the ethical obligations of lawyers engaged primarily in transactional work.79 The closest the
Canons come to a specific duty of corporate lawyers is a duty to
advise clients “to observe the statute law.”80 The Canons reveal
another serious problem with the lawyer-statesman ideal. When
given the chance to exercise their moral judgment, the elite bar
did so in a way that preserved their own status and autonomy at
the expense of their less wealthy and prestigious colleagues.
B. THE CORPORATE LAWYER AS TECHNICIAN
Later in the century the lawyer-statesman ideal was gradually replaced by an alternative vision: the lawyer as technician,
a skilled and reliable expert who used legal means to solve busi-

interests”). The Canons were an effort to restore higher ethical standards and
increase public respect for the profession. Altman, supra note 75, at 2413.
78. They sought to regulate unscrupulous or overzealous litigation tactics
by prohibiting assertion of claims or defenses that involve a “violation of law” or
“fraud or chicane.” CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS c. 15, 30 (AM. BAR ASS’N
1908); Altman, supra note 75, at 2453, 2456. They prescribed rules of conduct
for litigators toward opposing counsel and witnesses. CANONS c. 17, 18; Altman,
supra note 75, at 2454. They placed limits on lawyer advertising, solicitation of
clients, and other forms of commercialism, Altman, supra note 75, at 2475–91,
and sought to prevent bar admission and encourage disbarment of people of low
character and moral standards. CANONS c. 29. The Canons “enhanced the stratification” within the modern legal profession,” placing detailed restrictions on
the conduct of lawyers engaged in personal injury litigation or criminal defense,
but providing only the most general exhortations to the corporate bar to act
morally and with honor. Altman, supra note 75, at 2503; see also Gordon, Legal
Profession, supra note 39, at 100 (describing stratification of the bar by clientele).
79. They had the purely negative “right to decline employment” from any
client who might seek their advice on “questionable transactions” or other work
that might “offend the lawyer’s conscience.” CANONS c. 31; Altman, supra note
75, at 2458. The final Canon 32 expands on this obligation in broad terms and
is a reply of sorts to President Roosevelt. It states that no “client, corporate or
individual” is entitled to any “service or advice” which involves “disloyalty to the
law.” CANONS c. 32. It also required “exact compliance with respect to the strictest principles of moral law.” Id. Obligations phrased at that level of generality,
of course, left corporate lawyers free to do whatever their “consciences” dictated.
80. See CANONS c. 32. The Canons make clear, however, that such lawyers
usually had substantial leeway to make their own judgments of the “just meaning and extent” of such laws. Id. “[U]ntil a statute shall have been construed
and interpreted by competent adjudication, he is free and is entitled to advise
as to its validity and as to what he conscientiously believes to be its just meaning
and extent.” Id.
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ness problems and advance managerial goals. This change reflected the increasing importance of the administrative state.
Businesses were subject to complex new regulations and oversight,81 which often carried both criminal and civil penalties,82
and could be enforced through private rights of action.83 Corporations needed lawyers with highly specialized expertise not
only to defend them before courts and administrative agencies,
but to develop business practices that would avoid or reduce potential liability.
During the same period, legal realism became the dominant
theory taught in elite law schools84 and introduced students to a
more instrumental, empirical understanding of legal rules. Law
was seen less as embodying fundamental moral principles and
more as a positive means of structuring and regulating social
and economic activities.85 Legal rules could be analyzed on a
cost-benefit basis.86 Corporate avoidance of liability or fines was
simply a matter of risk management and cost reduction.87 Mindful of the Holmesian pronouncement that law was simply
“prophecies of what the courts will do in fact,”88 lawyers recognized the indeterminate and tentative nature of many legal
rules, particularly when confronting new and complex factual
81. See Gregory A. Mark, The Corporate Economy: Ideologies of Regulation
and Antitrust, 1920–2000, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA
613, 628–33 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008); Gordon,
Citizen Lawyer, supra note 39, at 1195–97.
82. John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and
Civil Law Models—And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1879–
81 (1992).
83. James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, The Evolution in the U.S. of Private
Enforcement via Litigation and Monitoring Techniques: Are There Lessons for
Germany?, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND GOVERNANCE
2–8 (Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-George Ringe eds., 2018).
84. David B. Wilkins, Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468,
468 (1990); cf. Eugene V. Rostow, American Legal Realism and the Sense of the
Profession, 34 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 123, 134–35 (1962) (defending legal realism
and its importance in the legal profession); Joseph W. Singer, Legal Realism
Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (“We are all legal realists now.”).
85. See Pepper, supra note 20, at 1552–54.
86. For an interesting analysis of the relationship between legal realism
and cost-benefit analysis among lawyers and judges, see Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986).
87. See Pepper, supra note 20, at 1553.
88. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461
(1897).
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situations. This enabled lawyers to develop business strategies
that “pushed the envelope” of what the law allowed and encouraged clients to ask them to be innovative in providing legal solutions to business problems.89
The management of corporations was also becoming professionalized as more companies were run by graduates of top business schools.90 CEOs had less need for lawyer-statesmen to ease
their entry into elite social and political circles and more need
for experts on the complex rules governing taxation, financial
disclosure, employment opportunity, environmental regulation,
and other rapidly changing legal fields.91 Rather than a “trusted
counselor,” managers preferred to rely on “general counsel,” a
loyal in-house subordinate who hired, supervised, and coordinated the legal work of numerous specialists, both in-house and
at outside firms.92 In addition, a new profession, compliance officers, were increasingly used to translate complex legal requirements for non-lawyer employees, as well as to prevent employee
conduct that could subject the company to serious liability.93
89. See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). In
Wellman, an innovative strategy to rapidly acquire a publicly traded company,
described by the court as a “brilliantly designed, lightning strike,” was held invalid as an illegal tender offer. Id. at 790. The subsidiary that conducted the
strategy was named “L.H.I.W.”, Inc. (an acronym for “Let’s [sic] Hope It Works”).
Id.
90. See generally RAKESH KHURANA, FROM HIGHER AIMS TO HIRED HANDS:
THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN BUSINESS SCHOOLS AND THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF MANAGEMENT AS A PROFESSION 23–50 (2007) (explaining the rise of large corporations and the role of business schools).
91. As Gordon notes, in this later period corporations were more interested
than they were previously in challenging regulations or labor agreements which
they saw as interfering with their activities or profitability. Gordon, Legal Profession, supra note 39, at 114. They sought lawyers who would raise such challenges or at least find useful loopholes and exemptions to them. See id. at 115.
92. Id. at 116.
93. See Robert C. Bird & Stephen Kim Park, The Domains of Corporate
Counsel in an Era of Compliance, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 203, 248–49 (2016) (“The
increasing immensity and complexity of business regulation have paved the way
for a robust compliance function, increasingly headed by a CCO and managed
by a separate compliance department under its control.”); id. at 203–04, 217–18
(describing recent steep regulatory costs to corporations and resulting increases
in job opportunities and salaries in the compliance profession); see also Donald
C. Langevoort, Caremark and Compliance: A Twenty-Year Lookback, 90 TEMP.
L. REV. 727, 727–28 (2018) (listing and citing to such legal and regulatory
changes, including In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698
A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996), and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107204, 116 Stat. 745).
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Corporate law firms changed as well. Transactional lawyers
often specialized not just in a particular area of law, but in a
particular kind of transaction: e.g., mergers, project financings,
or corporate restructurings.94 Corporations whose legal work
was controlled by cost-conscious general counsel rarely sent all
their outside work to a single firm, but rather expected firms to
compete in “dog and pony shows” demonstrating their expertise
and cost effectiveness.95 There was intra-firm competition as
well as individual lawyers vied with each other to generate more
revenue, enhance their professional reputations, and build
strong personal bonds with important clients, all of which were
seen as ways to maximize their prestige and earning power.96
These changes made corporate lawyers, particularly at the
top firms, more successful and substantially richer. Elite firms
expanded enormously, becoming national and international in
scope.97 By 2016, senior equity partners at such firms were averaging seven-figure compensation.98 The new style of practice
also encouraged legal creativity, as lawyers were expected to develop new legal approaches to dealing with corporate problems.
Corporate practice became more egalitarian, both in the kinds of
lawyers the firms hired and the clients they serviced.99 Yet all
94. Jaap Bosman, Are Lawyers Being Trapped In Their Practice Niches?,
ABA J. (Oct. 23, 2018, 6:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/voice/article/are_
lawyers_being_trapped_in_their_practice_niches [https://perma.cc/FC8W
-GW26] (questioning whether the “hyperspecialization” of law firm practice areas has “gone too far”).
95. KRONMAN, supra note 39, at 284–87.
96. See generally Robert W. Hillman, Law Firms and Their Partners Revisited: Reflections on Three Decades of Lawyer Mobility, 96 TEX. L. REV. 787 (2018)
(discussing the effects of lawyer mobility on law firms); KRONMAN, supra note
39, at 277–83 (explaining the rise in lateral movement between firms and the
increased paychecks and hours worked by associates).
97. See Eli Wald, Smart Growth: The Large Law Firm in the Twenty-First
Century, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2873 (2012).
98. JEFFREY A. LOWE, 2016 PARTNER COMPENSATION SURVEY, 11–12,
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/area/department/cdo/document/2016-partner
-compensation-survey-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHX3-YLPP].
99. See Scott Flaherty, Law Firms Took Steps Forward in Diversity in 2018,
Not Leaps: Report, AM. LAW. (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.law.com/
americanlawyer/2019/01/09/law-firms-took-steps-forward-in-diversity-in-2018
-not-leaps-report/?slreturn=20190820190529 [https://perma.cc/4Z9J-ESF4] (reporting growth in law firm hiring of minorities and women, but still substantial
underrepresentation). As to clients, consider the enormous success of Skadden
Arps, whose legendary partner, Joe Flom, was famous for advising corporate
raiders and similar clients when more traditional law firms would not. See
Ashby Jones & Joanna Chung, Flom, Consummate M&A Lawyer, Dies, WALL
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this success came with an undeniable diminution of social status. Corporate lawyers were no longer trusted counselors,
merely well paid and technically proficient hired hands.100 This,
as well as the increasing competitiveness and punishing hours,
seemed to have also led to a substantial increase in unhappiness
among corporate firm lawyers.101
Whether the lawyer-as-technician model also led to a decline
in ethical conduct is a more difficult question. Many have drawn
this conclusion, arguing that the modern corporate lawyers’ devotion to their clients’ interests destroys any possibility of exercising independent moral judgment or speaking out publicly on
matters affecting their clients.102 However, a focus on technical
competence and problem solving does not mean that lawyers
must act unethically. It is certainly possible that the role of lawyer-technician embodies its own set of ethical principles, less
grandiose than those of the lawyer-statesman, but more realistic, appropriate to current societal needs, and equally defensible
on moral grounds.103 Much of the work of the modern corporate
technician is either morally neutral or somewhat beneficial to

STREET J. (Feb. 24, 2011), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487
03775704576162103978038360.
100. Many corporate managers also viewed them, or at least the work they
performed, as a necessary but unfortunate cost of doing business. See Ronald J.
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239, 241–42 (1984).
101. Studies show that lawyers are substantially more depressed, suicidal,
and alcoholic than the public at large. Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy,
Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 874–80 (1999); Martin E.P. Seligman et al., Why
Lawyers Are Unhappy, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 33, 37–38 (2001) (focusing on young
lawyers at big law firms).
102. See, e.g., Gordon, Corporate Law Practice, supra note 39, at 257 (“Corporate counselors whose compliance guidance is likely to run into resistance
from their clients tend either not to offer it or rapidly convert the advice into
neutral risk-analysis and themselves into adversary advocates.”).
103. Such principles will often turn on the question of how much ethical responsibility a lawyer has for assisting clients to accomplish goals that are morally suspect but not violative of the law. Cf. Judith A. McMorrow & Luke M.
Scheuer, The Moral Responsibility of the Corporate Lawyer, 60 CATH. U.L. REV.
275, 275–80 (2010) (evaluating the nonaccountability theory and its principle
that “the attorney is not morally accountable” for their clients’ objectives); Richard W. Painter, The Moral Interdependence of Corporate Lawyers and Their Clients, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 507, 511, 513–14, 553–60 (1994) (arguing that a lawyer
“cannot always deny moral responsibility for their clients’ conduct” because lawyers and clients work interdependently).

2019]

LAWYER AS ACCOMPLICE

331

society.104 Corporate lawyers, aided by law and economic concepts with roots in legal realism, saw themselves as increasing
the value of societal assets by facilitating transactions that
moved assets to higher valuing users, providing information to
securities markets that enabled them to price stocks more efficiently, and helping create and regulate the market for corporate
control, which disciplined managers and increased shareholder
value.105
Yet it must be acknowledged that the morality of the lawyeras-technician role depends crucially on the morality of the corporate conduct being facilitated. To the extent there had been a
progressive consensus in the early years of the twentieth century, by the latter part of the century no such consensus existed.106 This was due in part to the success of the progressive

104. Much of what corporate lawyers do increases efficiency, both for the
firms they represent and the markets in which those firms operate. See Gilson,
supra note 100, at 243–44. The question of whether market efficiency itself has
moral value or is morally neutral is a longstanding unresolved debate. See Robert Skidelsky, The Moral Vulnerability of Markets, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar.
11, 2008), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-moral
-vulnerability-of-markets?barrier=accesspaylog. See generally ADAM SMITH,
THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (1759) (exploring morality across various
disciplines).
105. See Gilson, supra note 100, at 264. It is also worth remembering that
many of the shares whose value is increased are held by hospitals, universities,
union pension funds, and other socially beneficial institutions. Cf. Edward Glaeser, The Governance of Not-For-Profit Firms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 8921, 2002), nber.org/papers/w8921.pdf [https://perma
.cc/63LW-AUMB] (discussing management of nonprofits, including hospitals
and universities).
106. See Ben W. Heineman, Jr. et al., HARVARD LAW SCH. CTR. ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION, LAWYERS AS PROFESSIONALS AND AS CITIZENS: KEY ROLES
AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE 21ST CENTURY 9–13 (2014), https://clp.law
.harvard.edu/assets/Professionalism-Project-Essay_11.20.14.pdf [https://perma
.cc/VW2P-62Q6]. This ambitious project seeks to set forth “a practical vision of
the responsibilities of lawyers as both professionals and as citizens” which includes both the roles of “expert technician[ ] ” and “wise counselor[ ] .” Id. at 5.
The authors argue for a broad and diverse set of potential sources for determining the right course of conduct in a given legal context. Id. at 11 (including “the
spirit and letter of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; an implied social
contract between state-licensed professionals and the rest of society; the enlightened self-interest of the institutions in which lawyers serve; the role of law,
regulation, and norms as the foundation and expression of public policy and
private ordering; and lessons about lawyers’ roles in the history of our constitutional democracy and political economy.”).

332

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:309

and reform agenda itself, which had placed many aspects of private business activities under regulatory scrutiny and control.107
Questions about appropriate corporate conduct had thereby been
converted from primarily moral questions to legal and regulatory
ones.108 To the extent such debates invoked moral concerns as
well as economic, political, and social ones, there was no clear
consensus on such issues within the public at large nor among a
political or social “elite.”109
Individual lawyers, of course, are usually free to reject work
from clients whose products or actions they find morally objectionable,110 and many do.111 But most corporate lawyers, in my
experience, do not seek to pass moral judgment on the entire regulatory framework under which contemporary corporations conduct their business.112 While most have views as to whether
there should be more or less regulation in particular areas, they
view the system as a whole, if not as a positive moral good, at
least as a relatively accurate reflection of the political and social

107. See supra notes 81–83 and accompanying text.
108. Such technical questions may still have substantial normative content.
See Heineman et al., supra note 106, at 9–11 (discussing the distinction between
the questions “is it legal?,” “is it right?,” and “what should we do?”).
109. See David Dana, Environmental Lawyers and the Public Service Model
of Lawyering, 74 OR. L. REV. 57 (1995) and Ted Schneyer, Fuzzy Models of the
Corporate Lawyer as Environmental Compliance Counselor, 74 OR. L. REV. 99
(1995), for a discussion of the diverse factors that could influence the advice
lawyers give to corporate clients on complex environmental law matters.
110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). A lawyer must refuse or withdraw from representation that would result in “violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law.” Id. r. 1.16(a)(1). A lawyer also
has the option of withdrawing from representation “where the client insists on
taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has
a fundamental disagreement.” Id. r. 1.16 cmt. Such optional withdrawal is only
permitted when it “can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
client’s interests.” Id. In practical terms, this means that corporate advisors are
usually freer to refuse or withdraw from representation than advocates engaged
in ongoing litigation. See Louis M. Brown & Harold A. Brown, What Counsels
the Counselor? The Code of Professional Responsibility’s Ethical Considerations—A Preventive Law Analysis, 10 VAL. U. L. REV. 453, 474–75 (1976).
111. Michael I. Krauss, On Lawyers Defending Views They Don’t Believe In,
FORBES (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelkrauss/2014/03/
11/on-lawyers-defending-views-they-dont-believe-in [https://perma.cc/T8CP
-2KZN] (“Many of my students, for instance, have told me they will refuse to
represent tobacco companies upon graduation . . . .”).
112. See Heineman et al., supra note 106, at 10 (arguing that current laws
and regulations should be a source for normative decision-making).
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consensus that created it.113 Accordingly, they see ethical value
in: (1) helping their clients to conform their activities to those
laws; (2) advising, cajoling, or discussing the bad consequences
that will ensue if the corporation violates those laws; and (3)
steering corporate clients towards actions that can at least be
credibly argued to be within the bounds of the law.114
In many ways, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly Rule 1.2(d), reflect this more limited ethical
role for the lawyer-technician. The Model Rules do not expect
lawyers to ensure that their clients’ goals are ethical, nor do they
prescribe what those goals should be.115 Rather they view the
lawyer’s job as ensuring that the means clients use to achieve
113. See id.
114. In this context, it is worth noting that under the Model Rules, the lawyer’s advising function may include not just considerations of legality but may
refer to “other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 2.1.
115. See id. r. 1.2(d). The Model Rules, adopted by the ABA in 1983, reflect
a somewhat defensive response to new concerns about the legal profession
which were coming not just from the public but from courts and administrative
agencies. See ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE, DEATH OF THE GUILDS: PROFESSIONS,
STATES, AND THE ADVANCE OF CAPITALISM, 1930 TO THE PRESENT 32–33 (1996)
(describing a loss of “guild power” in the legal and other professions after the
mid-1960s due to growing power of regulatory agencies); see also Richard L.
Abel, Why Does the ABA Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639, 650
(1981). The Supreme Court had held that the legal profession was a “trade or
commerce” whose professional standards were subject to antitrust scrutiny.
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 773 (1975). Even more troubling for
corporate lawyers was the potential liability of securities lawyers who were either involved in preparation of false and misleading public filings or failed to
disclose such violations. At least one federal court had found such liability, SEC
v. Nat’l Student Marketing. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 682 (D.D.C. 1978), and the
SEC had begun disciplinary proceedings against some lawyers from prominent
firms who had engaged in such conduct. See Michael J. Powell, Developments in
the Regulation of Lawyers: Competing Segments and Market, Client, and Government Controls, 64 SOC. FORCES 281, 295–96 (1985). The ABA strongly criticized the SEC’s actions. Id. at 296. The Model Rules failed to provide any specific ethical standards for lawyers practicing in particular fields, such as
securities or in-house corporate counsel, opting instead for an “intermediate”
level of generality which provided different rules addressed to different legal
tasks like “advising, advocacy, negotiating, intermediating, and evaluating.”
Robert J. Kutak, Evaluating the Proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1016, 1019 n.10 (1980). Model Rule 1.6(b) was later
amended to reflect new disclosure obligations of corporate lawyers under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in light of the Enron and Worldcom scandals. See Clifton
Barnes, ABA, States, and SEC Hash Out Lawyers’ Responsibility in Corporate
Settings, 28 B. LEADER 6, 6 (2003).
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those goals are within the bounds of the law, at least the criminal
law.116 Fostering compliance by clients with positive law, which
reflects contemporary social, economic, and political norms, is
the primary moral justification for the work of the corporate lawyer.117
C. THE CORPORATE LAWYER AS ACCOMPLICE
The great danger of the lawyer-as-technician model is that
an exclusive focus on achieving the client’s goals can transform
corporate lawyers from expert advisors to accomplices in immoral, fraudulent, or illegal business practice.118 In recent years,
there has been increasing concern that many corporate lawyers
have stepped over the line from technicians to accomplices.119
This concern reflects a number of significant changes in the
world of business and law.
In some areas of considerable interest to business, the law
has become increasingly obscure even contradictory. Consider
the legality of marijuana sales, a felony under federal law, yet
legal under statutes in many states.120 This not-quite-legal activity could represent a substantial opportunity for certain types
of businesses but advising such clients poses great dangers for
lawyers who seek to advise them.121 In the marijuana case, the
contradictory legal rules are primarily the result of differing regional conceptions of the propriety and benefits of marijuana usage and the lack of a national consensus on that issue.122 In other
116. See supra notes 8–11, 20 and accompanying text.
117. The Model Rules have been described as an attempt to “reprofessionalize” the business of lawyering by preserving substantial “autonomy of technique.” Powell, supra note 115, at 300. Unlike the medical profession, where
government regulations had a major impact on the way doctors provided medical services, “the essential task autonomy of lawyers remains unfettered.” Id. It
has also been argued that the adoption of the Model Rules moved ethical considerations away from the “aspirational tradition” of the lawyer-statesman, substituting a conception of ethics as composed solely of “clear penal rules.” Gordon,
Citizen Lawyer, supra note 39, at 1197.
118. See infra pp. 60–61, 73–74.
119. See infra pp. 60–61, 73–74.
120. See infra notes 126–30 and accompanying text.
121. See infra Part II.A.
122. See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text. The ambiguity also reflects the increasing tendency of the executive, faced with legislative gridlock,
to use the enforcement policy to effectively repeal or lessen the impact of disfavored laws. See Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 787–92 (2013); see also Zachary S.
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areas, uncertainty may be created by large disparities between
laws and regulations “on the books” and the way those laws and
regulations are applied and enforced in actual practice.123 Disparities may reflect that the formal rules have become technologically outdated, overly expensive to comply with, or lacking in
government resources or commitment for detection and enforcement.124 In these cases, so-called “disruptive” businesses may
seek to operate in conscious disregard of such regulations with
the hope of creating a social consensus in favor of their modification or repeal.125
Second, business professionals have increasingly come to
see the law, or the adverse consequences of violations of the law,
as simply another form of business risk that should be identified,
quantified, minimized, and managed.126 Corporate clients expect
their lawyers and compliance departments to help structure
their business operations to minimize legal exposure and detect
lower level wrongdoing that could subject the company to unnecessary liability.127 Yet they are also open to the possibility that
certain corporate actions, although violations of laws with criminal penalties attached, might still constitute risks worth taking.128 In making such determinations, corporate officers increasingly expect their legal advisors to give them information

Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 671, 689–
90 (2014).
123. See infra Parts II.B–C.
124. See infra Parts II.B–C.
125. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 427–28.
126. Pepper, supra note 20, at 1559–64; Pollman, supra note 5, at 724–28;
Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 417–18, 427–28.
127. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
128. Compliance departments treat legal risk by first evaluating the potential type, severity, and likelihood of risk contemplated. See Robert C. Bird &
Stephen Kim Park, Turning Corporate Compliance into Competitive Advantage,
19 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 285, 304–11 (2017) (describing companies’ varied approaches to, and inefficiencies in evaluations of, compliance risks); Maureen
Mohlenkamp, Compliance Risks: What You Don’t Contain Can Hurt You,
DELOITTE, https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/pages/finance/articles/cfo-insights
-compliance-risks.html [https://perma.cc/59UP-KYVT] (defining “compliance
risk” as “the threat posed to a company’s financial, organizational, or reputational standing resulting from violations of laws, regulations, codes of conduct,
or organizational standards of practice,” and describing how Chief Compliance
Officers (CCOs) mitigate such risk); see also Geoffrey Parsons Miller, Compliance: Past, Present and Future, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 437, 438 (2017) (stating that
CCOs, while calculating risks, “must take account of and be sensitive to the
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not just on the content of the law, but the likelihood of its enforcement against the company in specific circumstances, as well
as the monetary and other penalties that authorities are likely
to impose.129
There is also concern that corporate lawyers are becoming
less able and less willing to resist client requests for advice on
how to violate the law while minimizing risks of detection and
sanctions. This is partially the result of recent changes in the
structure of corporate law firms, the increased specialization of
corporate lawyers, and the intensity of both inter- and intrafirm
competition among them.130 It also reflects support, by some lawyers, for the “disruptive” practices of some contemporary businesses, which see violations of “minor” regulatory strictures as
necessary to restructure industries more efficiently and profitably.131
Some corporate lawyers have always had trouble walking
the line between advising clients about the law and facilitating
criminal misconduct. My use of the phrase “lawyer as accomplice” is meant in a broad, metaphorical sense to describe any
morally questionable facilitation of such misconduct, whether or
not the lawyers involved meet the actual requirements for criminal liability as accessories. However, there have certainly been
basic business pressures facing their organizations”). Based on such evaluations, management and counsel might very well conclude that even criminally
prosecutable actions are worth committing. See Constance E. Bagley et al., Who
Let the Lawyers Out?: Reconstructing the Role of the Chief Legal Officer and the
Corporate Client in a Globalizing World, 18 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 419, 439–48 (2016)
(describing the increase of corporate criminal activity in recent years, possibly
due to justifications that such misconduct would be “economically rational” and
asking, “[h]ave companies accepted the payment of fines and damages as just a
cost of doing business?”); Pollman, supra note 5, at 731–48 (listing numerous
examples of open and intentional corporate legal violations).
129. See supra note 128.
130. Tax lawyers may have been among the first to succumb to such pressures. The development of a market in “abusive tax shelters” for corporations
was based, in substantial part, on the exploitation by tax lawyers of the limited
resources of the Treasury for detection and enforcement of shelters based on
questionable factual or legal claims. See Tanina Rostain, Sheltering Lawyers:
The Organized Tax Bar and the Tax Shelter Industry, 23 YALE J. REG. 77, 78
(2006). Although some of these abuses were ultimately constrained by new legislative and regulatory measures (supported by much of the tax bar), substantial issues remain. See John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni, The Decline in
Tax Adviser Professionalism in American Society, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2721,
2724–26 (2016).
131. See infra Parts II.B–C.
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instances in recent history of criminal charges brought or threatened against corporate lawyers whose advice allegedly facilitated corporate crimes.132
Two recent developments have raised further concerns
about the ethics of corporate lawyers. First, the Global Witness
report demonstrated the willingness of many major law firms to
aid what appeared to be corrupt foreign clients bringing money
into the United States in violation of anti-money laundering and
other laws.133 Second, the Panama Papers documented actual in-

132. Two prominent examples are the Enron scandal (where no criminal
charges against its law firm Vinson & Elkins were brought, but were likely deterred by a $30 million civil settlement) and the Lincoln Savings Bank collapse
(where criminal charges were actually brought against Kaye Scholar by the
banking regulator but were later settled). See Robert W. Gordon, A New Role
for Lawyers?: The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185,
1189 (2003); see also Smith, supra note 10, at 513–20.
133. See GLOBAL WITNESS, LOWERING THE BAR: HOW AMERICAN LAWYERS
TOLD US HOW TO FUNNEL SUSPECT FUNDS INTO THE UNITED STATES (2016),
https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/18208/Lowering_the_Bar.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U6JA-CSW4]. Global Witness was a hoax, developed by an international NGO, to investigate the ethics of some major New York corporate
law firms. Id. at 1. An investigator posed as an advisor to a West African government minister who was seeking to move millions of dollars, earned in exchange for granting mining rights, to a U.S. bank account. Id. at 1, 5–6. While
none of the thirteen firms contacted actually agreed to take the minister on as
a client, all except one provided helpful suggestions, apparently in anticipation
of future representation. Id. at 1. Some suggested using anonymous companies
or trusts to hide the assets, offered advice on how to move the money into the
U.S. or offered use of their own bank accounts. Id. Only two firms stated that
they could not assist. Id. Legal ethics professors William Simon and John
Leubsdorf, after reviewing transcripts of the conversations between the investigator and three of the New York lawyers, concluded that each of the lawyers
would have violated their ethical duties if the undercover investigator had been
an actual prospective client. See Letter from John Leubsdorf, Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers Sch. of Law, William. H. Simon, Professor, Columbia Law
Sch., and Professor Emeritus, Stanford Law Sch., to Global Witness (Jan. 28,
2015), https://www.globalwitness.org/documents/18209/Opinion_of_John_
Leubsdorf_and_William_Simon.pdf [https://perma.cc/P55S-MD63]. Indeed, the
Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court recently issued public censures to at least two of the attorneys named in the report. Scott Flaherty, Undercover ‘60 Minutes’ Video Leads to NY Lawyer’s Public Censure, N.Y. L.J.
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/01/16/
undercover-60-minutes-video-leads-to-ny-lawyers-public-censure/. Several of
the lawyers named in the report have publicly objected to the investigation’s
methods or the report’s interpretations of their statements to the undercover
investigator, or have otherwise tried to justify their statements as ethically permissible. See Louise Story, Report Describes Lawyers’ Advice on Moving Suspect
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stances of a Panamanian law firm helping clients evade detection of tax liability, money laundering, and other laws.134 These
actions are deeply troubling and have prompted powerful and
well-taken jeremiads against the declining ethical standards of
the profession.135

Funds into U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/
01/us/report-describes-lawyers-advice-on-moving-suspect-funds-into-us.html
[https://perma.cc/33LG-FFJ7] (stating that one attorney “told The Times by
email that his comment was meant to address privacy concerns that the supposed minister might have” as opposed to providing money laundering advice,
and quoting another lawyer that said his clients use LLCs “not because they’re
hiding money” but because “they’re afraid of being screwed by somebody”).
134. See Eric Lipton & Julie Creswell, Panama Papers Show How Rich
United States Clients Hid Millions Abroad, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/us/panama-papers.html [https://perma.cc/X373
-A4WK]. The “Panama Papers” refer to the estimated eleven million leaked documents created by the Panamanian law firm Mossack Fonseca, documenting
how it set up offshore bank accounts and shell companies on behalf of wealthy
individuals from the U.S. and abroad. See id.; see also Peter J. Henning, Panama Papers Show How Lawyers Can Turn a Blind Eye, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/12/business/dealbook/panama-papers
-show-how-lawyers-can-turn-a-blind-eye.html [https://perma.cc/M2PM-BZ9D].
The leak prompted many in the media, as well as legal scholars, not only to
question whether lawyers could avoid helping their clients engage in illegal activity, but also the rules dictating lawyers’ obligations relating to such clients.
See, e.g., Henning, supra note 134 (describing how “legal ethics rules do little to
restrict how lawyers can represent clients who flirt with the edges of the law”);
see also Heather M. Field, Offshoring Tax Ethics: The Panama Papers, Seeking
Refuge from Tax, and Tax Lawyer Referrals, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 35, 47–48
(2017) (suggesting that broadened enforcement of, or changes to, the Model
Rules and other laws might prevent unethical referrals). In response to the Panama Papers, some countries have taken action to prevent lawyers from assisting
their clients with committing tax evasion, money laundering, and similar
crimes. See Laurel S. Terry & José Carlos Llerena Robles, The Relevance of
FATF’s Recommendations and Fourth Round of Mutual Evaluations to the Legal Profession, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 627, 638–39 (2018) (listing actions taken
in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin America). In the U.S., five of Mossack
Fonseca’s American clients were recently indicted for “‘falsely and fraudulently
fail[ing] to report’ their undeclared offshore accounts.” Will Fitzgibbon, What
the Panama Papers Tell Us About the Clients in the Latest Bombshell Charges,
INT’L CONSORTIUM INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISTS (Dec. 7, 2018), https://www.icij
.org/investigations/panama-papers/what-the-panama-papers-tell-us-about-the
-clients-in-the-latest-bombshell-charges [https://perma.cc/EN7L-PDW4].
135. See, e.g., Mike Donaldson, Lawyers and the Panama Papers: How Ethical Rules Contribute to the Problem and Might Provide a Solution, 22 LAW &
BUS. REV. AM. 363 (2016) (discussing how the ethical rules are insufficient to
prohibit attorneys from helping clients break the law).
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The focus of this Article, however, is somewhat different. It
seeks to analyze and understand more morally ambiguous forms
of legal advice. Such advice deals with activities which I term
“not-quite legal.” These activities are technical violations of
criminal laws. Therefore, advising clients about them also violates Model Rule 1.2.136 Yet the activities involved do not raise
serious moral concerns for the lawyers involved nor perhaps for
most members of the general public. Three of the most salient
current examples of such activities are: (1) marijuana businesses; and “disruptive” startup enterprises like (2) Uber and (3)
Airbnb. Part II provides a detailed analysis of the unique ethical
problems each of these businesses pose for lawyers seeking to
advise them.
II. A LOOK AT THE ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
SOME “DISRUPTIVE” BUSINESSES
A. MIXED SIGNALS: THE LEGAL ETHICS OF ADVISING CANNABIS
BUSINESSES
In most American states today, advising clients about the
“law” regulating cannabis businesses requires interpretation of
a complex mix of state regulation and contrary federal statutes,
as well as ambiguous federal enforcement guidelines mixed with
some reading of political tea leaves. Cannabis businesses currently operate in a gray area of the not-quite-legal, where their
ability to conduct business requires conformity to complex state
regulatory regimes while also attempting to remain outside of
existing federal enforcement guidelines for activities that are
still a clear, formal violation of federal criminal law.137 Ethics
commissions and advisory opinions increasingly recognize that
in this unique legal environment, conscientious lawyering requires informing and assisting clients concerning federal enforcement policies to minimize the likelihood of enforcement action by federal authorities.138 The very complexity and ambiguity
of the law itself has created a situation where, in order to adequately advise the client, many lawyers feel it necessary to discuss and advise their clients on the likelihood of enforcement and
the kinds of conduct that would minimize potential enforcement.
Accordingly, the line drawn in Rule 1.2(d) between “advising”
136. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
137. See infra notes 140–44 and accompanying text.
138. See infra notes 171–77 and accompanying text.
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about the content of the law and “assisting” in its violation seems
to break down completely.139
The black letter law regarding production and sale of cannabis products can be succinctly stated. “Marihuana” is a Schedule I controlled substance under the federal Controlled Substances Act.140 Any person or entity that “knowingly or
intentionally” manufactures, distributes, or dispenses marijuana, or possesses with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense such a substance, is guilty of a criminal violation of federal
law and is subject to imprisonment and substantial fines.141 Nevertheless, many states have adopted statutes that purport to legalize the manufacture, distribution, dispensing, and possession
of marijuana, either for medical or recreational purposes.142
These statutes, while frequently declaring certain uses and sales
of marijuana products “lawful,” do not and cannot change the
federal statutory prohibition.143 Accordingly, as a matter of authoritative legal doctrine, marijuana use, sale, and manufacture
remains illegal in all fifty states, with no exceptions for medical
or other use.144
When we move from the “law on the books” to the “law in
action,” however, the situation looks quite different. The passage
of legislation purporting to legalize marijuana has given rise to

139. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016).
140. 21 U.S.C. § 812(c) (2012).
141. Id. § 841.
142. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 2018); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 44-12-102 (2018); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221 (McKinney 2019).
143. Although it has been cogently argued that these state statutes are not
preempted by federal law, because they are compatible with obedience to federal
law, such arguments do not challenge the continued validity of the federal prohibition. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 102–03 (2015); Franklin Guenthner,
Pot, Printz, and Preemption: Why States Can “Just Say No” to Jeff Sessions and
the Controlled Substances Act, MINN. L. REV.: DE NOVO (Apr. 26, 2017),
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/2017/04/pot-printz-and-preemption
[https://perma.cc/PZ7V-LZ39].
144. There have been a few attempts by legal scholars to argue that subsequent developments may have rendered the federal prohibition on marijuana
production and sale invalid, but they seem unlikely to be adopted by federal
courts in the near future. See Robert Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Overlooked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62
VAND. L. REV 1421, 1423 (2009); see also Andrew LeVay, Note, Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699, 701 (2000).

2019]

LAWYER AS ACCOMPLICE

341

a multi-billion dollar industry.145 “Legal” sales of marijuana
products in the United States were estimated to be about 9 billion dollars in 2017.146 At that time, 30 states had laws legalizing
marijuana use for medical purposes, and nine had laws legalizing recreational use.147 In January 2018, licensing authorities in
California were instructed to begin issuing licenses to businesses
providing recreational marijuana for adult use.148 News media
and other forms of popular discourse frequently refer to states
that have “legalized” marijuana.149 One can easily find advertisements for programs that purport to instruct potential entrepreneurs how to start and operate various cannabis-related businesses.150 There are also programs directed at lawyers who seek
to advise such businesses.151
Underlying all this activity is the perception by most knowledgeable observers that the likelihood of federal enforcement action against activities expressly permitted under the various
state statutes is slight. This was not always the case. During
George W. Bush’s administration, the federal government frequently took action against businesses engaged in the sale of
145. Aaron Smith, The U.S. Legal Marijuana Industry Is Booming, CNN
MONEY (Jan. 31, 2018), https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/31/news/marijuana
-state-of-the-union/ [https://perma.cc/Y75N-MZUM].
146. Id.
147. Id. Other authorities have put the number of states permitting “some
extent of medical marijuana use” at thirty-five. See BLUE RIBBON COMM’N ON
MARIJUANA POLICY, PATHWAYS REPORT: POLICY OPTIONS FOR REGULATING MARIJUANA IN CALIFORNIA (2015) https://www.safeandsmartpolicy.org/wp
-content/uploads/2015/07/BRCPathwaysReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CZ4E-S5XW].
148. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 26012(d) (West 2018).
149. See, e.g., Zoe Chevalier, Recreational Marijuana: A Business Boon for
States?, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/
articles/2018-08-01/the-legalization-of-recreational-marijuana-an-economic
-opportunity-for-states [https://perma.cc/8S5Q-AV2E] (discussing the possible
boon to Massachusetts in “legalizing” marijuana); Adia Robinson, Where States
Stand on Legalizing Recreational and Medical Marijuana, ABC NEWS (July 14,
2018), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/states-stand-legalizing-recreational
-medical-marijuana/story?id=56466308 [https://perma.cc/K9EN-4BNP]; see
also Sean Williams, 3 Surprising Stocks That Could Benefit from Marijuana’s
Legalization, MOTLEY FOOL (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.fool.com/investing/
2018/09/13/3-surprising-stocks-that-could-benefit-from-mariju.aspx
[https://perma.cc/SEU7-RMBD].
150. See GREENZIPP, https://greenzipp.com [https://perma.cc/H24Q-G9AM].
151. See, e.g., Brochure, DRI Cannabis Law Seminar: Litigation Tips, Risk
Mitigation, Policy Updates, and Strategies in a Developing Regulatory Landscape (May 15, 2019) (on file with author).
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medical marijuana.152 During his first Presidential campaign,
Barack Obama pledged to curtail such raids.153 After his election, the Justice Department issued a series of statements which
seemed to effectuate and even go beyond that pledge. A 2009
statement by Deputy Attorney General Ogden announced that,
“[a]s a general matter, pursuit of [federal] priorities should not
focus federal resources in your States on individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing
state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”154 After
this statement was issued there was substantial expansion of
medical marijuana dispensaries.155 The Justice Department
quickly backtracked. It issued another announcement in 2011
stating that the Ogden Memorandum “was never intended to
shield [marijuana production and sale] from federal enforcement
action and prosecution, even where those activities purport to
comply with state law.”156 This retrenchment was accompanied
by actual legal actions taken by U.S. Attorneys against marijuana dispensaries in a number of states.157 On August 29, 2013,
however, federal policy appeared to change once again.158 Deputy Attorney General James Cole issued a memorandum setting
forth federal “priorities” for enforcement of the law regarding
marijuana production and sale.159 In general, those priorities
were compatible with the new state laws and seemed to signal a
federal policy of noninterference with reasonable and well-administered state laws regarding marijuana sales.160

152. See, e.g., Cheryl Thompson, DEA Chief Tough on Medical Marijuana,
WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2001, at A4.
153. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 143, at 86.
154. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General David Ogden to Selected
United States Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009) (on file with author) [hereinafter Ogden
Memo].
155. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 143, at 87.
156. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James Cole to All United
States Attorneys (June 29, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cole Memo
I].
157. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 143, at 88.
158. See Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General James Cole to All
United States Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cole
Memo II].
159. Id. These priorities included prevention of sale to minors, denying revenue to criminal enterprises, and preventing facilitation of sales of other illegal
drugs.
160. See Bradley Markano, Enabling State Deregulation of Marijuana
Through Executive Branch Nonenforcement, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2015)

2019]

LAWYER AS ACCOMPLICE

343

The election of Donald Trump was followed by a new announcement of federal enforcement policy. On January 4, 2018,
Attorney General Sessions issued a statement disavowing the
need for any “nationwide guidance specific to marijuana enforcement” and expressly rescinded all the guidance issued on this
subject during the Obama administration.161 Instead, he stated
that federal prosecutors should “follow the well-established principles that govern all federal prosecutions.”162 While some observers believe the Sessions Memo may portend a new round of
federal prosecutions in legalizing states, so far this does not appear to have occurred.163
At the formal level, state and federal law are directly contradictory and incompatible. The flexible and discretionary nature of federal enforcement policy, however, has created the possibility that cannabis businesses in many states can conduct
their activities, if not quite legally, at least without state or federal impediment.164 This is obviously critical information for

(commenting on the President’s apparent intention to “deprioritize and even ignore” marijuana activity that is monitored and regulated by the states); see also
Cole Memo II, supra note 158, at 3 (stating in part that, “[i]n jurisdictions that
have enacted laws legalizing marijuana in some form and that have also implemented strong and effective regulatory and enforcement systems . . . enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement and regulatory bodies
should remain the primary means of addressing marijuana-related activity”).
161. Memorandum from Attorney General Jefferson Sessions to All United
States Attorneys (Jan. 4, 2018) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sessions
Memo].
162. Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-27.200 (218) (elaborating on the probable cause requirement and the principles of prosecutorial discretion U.S. Attorneys have in launching an investigation into a supposed violation of federal law).
163. A number of bills that would legalize marijuana businesses in states
that permit it have been introduced in Congress. The one that has received the
most attention is the “Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act” (STATES Act) introduced on June 7, 2018 by Senators Cory
Gardner and Elizabeth Warren. STATES Act, S. 3032, 115th Cong. (2018).
Many interpret President Trump’s positive comments regarding the STATES
Act and his meeting with Senator Gardner to mean that the Sessions Memo’s
rescinding of prior guidance will not inhibit the cannabis industry in states like
Colorado. See Evan Halper, Trump Administration Abandons Crackdown on
Legal Marijuana, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.latimes.com/politics/
la-na-pol-marijuana-trump-20180413-story.html
[https://perma.cc/XQP9-NJGU].
164. See supra notes 152–63 and accompanying text (detailing the broad
swings in federal enforcement policy in recent years).
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lawyers to impart to their clients who wish to engage in cannabis-related activities. The mere fact that it can be done, however,
is insufficient. Lawyers must explain how it can be done. What
kinds of activities are likely to come to the attention of federal
authorities? What kinds of activities are most likely to concern
them? Can such activities be prevented, diminished, or concealed from federal scrutiny? It is easy to see how attempting to
answer such questions could be construed as “assisting” a federal
criminal enterprise, not merely “advising” on matters of law.
Of course, it is possible for lawyers of the old school to counsel their clients against engaging in such activities at all, at least
until the law has been clarified by definitive statutes or court
rulings.165 It is hard to imagine many contemporary American
corporate lawyers concluding that is the appropriate advice to
give. For one thing, it would probably lose them the client.166 For
an entrepreneur contemplating starting or expanding a cannabis
business where such an enterprise would be legal under state
law, the legal risks of going forward would appear to be far outweighed by the business risks of waiting.167 Moreover, as state
marijuana legalization laws proliferate and the businesses
themselves grow at fantastic rates, it becomes increasingly hard
to imagine any federal administration seeking to change enforcement policies in a way that would dismantle a multi-billion dollar industry that is a source of rapidly increasing tax revenues.168
More importantly, it is extremely doubtful that, in the current legal environment, advising a client to avoid or abandon a
165. See, e.g., Reinhart, supra note 23, at 8–9.
166. On the contemporary importance of lawyers retaining their clients, see
supra text and notes 97, 104–05.
167. There is undoubtedly a first mover advantage to being one of the early
entrants into the market, establishing a loyal customer base, perhaps some
brand recognition and reputational good will, all before larger, richer competitors come in and make it more difficult to get a foothold on the market. From
this perspective, even the uncertainty regarding the legality of the product represents a sort of competitive advantage, since it likely is keeping the big cigarette, liquor and drug companies out of the market for some time. Even the remaining legal risk has some upside in that it makes the business seem
attractively disruptive and “edgy.” See Katie Conley, The Dopest Cannabis Commercial (Ever), DOPE MAG. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://dopemagazine.com/briteside
-pharma-parody-commercial/ [https://perma.cc/C35S-S69U] (discussing the
Briteside delivery company’s pharmaceutical-parody commercial, featuring
trite strumming instrumentals over lines describing their product as “stickyicky”).
168. See supra notes 145–49 and accompanying text.
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marijuana business because of its formal illegality would be complete and accurate legal advice. First, it fails to provide clients
with a realistic account of the actual legal situation their businesses face. The fact that all cannabis businesses are formally
illegal under federal law should not be treated as the sole dispositive fact but simply one of many legally significant facts about
current regulatory practices, which indicate some degree of acquiescence by federal authorities in the newer state approaches
to “legalization.”169 This presents the client with a fuller, more
accurate picture of what “the law” in this area actually is.
Second, many lawyers would view the issue here as not one
of legality to be determined by the lawyer, but one of risk preference to be determined by the client. That is, once the lawyers
have set forth all the relevant legal and regulatory considerations, including their best estimate of the probabilities of various
changes in the status quo, it is up to the client to make the ultimate risk assessment as to whether to conduct such activities
based on business, financial, and legal concerns.170 This does not
mean that every legal question should be converted to a risk
management problem. But in the unique circumstances of marijuana regulation, where government enforcement policies rather
than formal legal rules appear to provide the most relevant normative guidance, a risk management-based client decision might
well be both appropriate and prudent.
State ethics commissions are increasingly coming to similar
conclusions,171 although there remain divergences and disagreements in the advice they give to lawyers regarding advising marijuana businesses. Recognizing the unique state of the law in
this area, some states have promulgated additional rules to their
codes of professional conduct, additional comments to the existing rules, or issued specific advisory ethics opinions dealing with
the appropriate role of the lawyer in advising marijuana businesses.172 A number of early opinions took the formalist position,
concluding that the federal statutory prohibition makes it unethical for lawyers to advise or assist marijuana businesses, even in
states that have legalized it for medical or other purposes.173

169. See supra notes 152–63 and accompanying text (detailing varied federal
enforcement policies).
170. See supra notes 85–89, 105–14 and accompanying text.
171. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
172. See infra note 174 and accompanying text.
173. However, many of these decisions have subsequently been rescinded or
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Others essentially track the language of the Model Rule, stating
that as long as lawyers disclose both relevant state and federal
laws concerning marijuana, lawyers may “discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a [marijuana
business] client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”174 These rules permit lawyers to “counsel and
assist” clients regarding application of state law and frequently
cite the need to discuss federal “policy” as well as “law.”175 This
suggests it is permissible for lawyers to render assistance to clients who seek to establish marijuana businesses so long as they
are compliant with state law and unlikely to engender enforcement interest under federal policy guidelines. They do not, however, expressly say that.
A third category of rules, comments, and advisory opinions
expressly allow lawyers to render legal assistance to marijuana
businesses irrespective of contrary federal law with various levels of specificity. For example, the New York State Bar Ethics
Committee concluded in 2014 that New York’s Rules of Professional Conduct permits a lawyer “to assist a client in conduct
designed to comply with state medical marijuana law, notwithstanding that federal narcotics law prohibits [such sales].”176 Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct state that lawyers may
“counsel or assist a client in conduct expressly permitted by Illinois law that may violate or conflict with federal or other law, as
modified. See, e.g., Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 199 (July 7, 2010), superseded by subsequent opinions, Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 214 (May 4,
2016), and Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 215 (Mar. 1, 2017). Compare Ohio
Bd. of Prof’l Conduct Op. 2016-6 (Aug. 5, 2016) (“[A] lawyer cannot deliver legal
services to assist a client in the establishment and operation of a state regulated
marijuana enterprise that is illegal under federal law.”), with OHIO RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(d)(2) (OHIO STATE BAR 2017) (explaining, after a rules
amendment adopted only one month after the Ohio Board of Professional Conduct’s opinion, that “[a] lawyer may counsel or assist a client regarding conduct
expressly permitted under [Ohio’s medical marijuana statute]”).
174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2019). See,
e.g., COLO. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 14 (COLO. BAR ASS’N 2016);
OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (OR. STATE BAR 2018) (“[A] lawyer may
counsel and assist a client regarding Oregon’s marijuana-related laws. In the
event Oregon law conflicts with federal or tribal law, the lawyer shall also advise the client regarding related federal and tribal law and policy.”); WASH.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2 cmt. 18 (WASH. STATE BAR ASS’N 2018).
175. OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d).
176. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 1024 ¶ 26 (Sept. 29,
2014).
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long as the lawyer advises the client about that federal or other
law and its potential consequences.”177
Increasingly, various state authorities on the ethics of advising marijuana clients seem to tacitly endorse the conclusion
that, under the complex and uncertain state of current law and
federal enforcement policy, it is appropriate for lawyers to advise
cannabis clients as to how to comply with relevant state laws
while also minimizing the danger of federal enforcement.178
While the existence of such authorities make it unlikely the lawyers will be subject to state disciplinary proceedings for providing such advice or assistance, this can only be a small comfort to
cannabis lawyers, whose more serious concerns lie elsewhere.179
Moreover, the relatively permissive attitude of the new ethics
rules are based, implicitly and frequently explicitly, on the noninterventionist federal enforcement policies of the later Obama
years. The rules regarding the counsel of cannabis clients would
certainly change if the Trump Justice Department adopts a more
aggressive policy of enforcement of federal marijuana laws.180
Additionally, ethics advisory opinions and rule comments are not
binding on courts,181 making the threat of private lawsuits the
greatest danger to marijuana lawyers.182
177. ILL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (ILL. STATE BAR ASS’N 2016).
See also id. cmt. 10 (stating that Rule 1.2(d) was adopted to “address the dilemma facing a lawyer in Illinois after the passage of the Illinois Compassionate
Use of Medical Cannabis Pilot Program Act”).
178. See supra notes 171–77 and accompanying text.
179. David L. Hudson Jr., Not So Fast, 103 A.B.A. J. 24 (Jan. 2017) (“‘As far
as I know, no attorney has ever been disciplined for providing typical services
to someone who is obeying state law on medical marijuana,’ says Robert Mikos,
an expert on federalism and drug law who teaches a course on marijuana law
and policy at Vanderbilt University Law School . . . .”).
180. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics Op. 1024 ¶ 25
(Sept. 29, 2014).
181. See, e.g., VA. STATE BAR PROF’L GUIDELINES § 10-2(C) (VA. STATE BAR
2016) (“Advisory Opinions express the judgment of the Committee and are not
binding on any judicial or administrative tribunal.”); Colorado Ethics Handbook, COLORADO BAR ASS’N, https://www.cobar.org/ethicsopinions [https://
perma.cc/R6DU-KW39] (“Formal Ethics Opinions are issued for advisory purposes only and are not in any way binding on the Colorado Supreme Court, the
Presiding Disciplinary Judge, the Attorney Regulation Committee, or the Office
of Attorney Regulation Counsel and do not provide protection against disciplinary actions.”).
182. It is in private lawsuits that the potential loss of attorney-client privilege, malpractice insurance coverage, and some of the other risks of representing marijuana businesses are most likely to occur. See infra notes 185–87 and
accompanying text.
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In the Winter 2017 issue of Criminal Justice, an ABA publication, a former federal prosecutor cautioned that “tremendous
legal and ethical risks exist for any lawyer representing clients
in [the cannabis market], despite state laws and bar opinions to
the contrary.”183 He went on to list some of the many potential
adverse consequences, all of which flowed from the possibility
that any lawyer who goes beyond strictly advising about the prohibitions of federal marijuana law risks being found to have “assist[ed]” and thereby aided and abetted a criminal act.184 Lawyers who are held to have aided and abetted such criminal acts
could be denied coverage under their malpractice insurance if
they are ever sued for malpractice by a disgruntled marijuana
client.185 Their attorneys’ fees could be subject to forfeiture for
knowingly accepting money from an illegal source.186 And their
conversations with marijuana clients might not be protected as
attorney-client communications in any lawsuits to which they
were relevant.187
These risks are substantial and serious enough that they are
probably keeping a large number of corporate lawyers from seeking to advise marijuana businesses despite their ability and expertise. Some might view this as a positive result: an example of
appropriate lawyer caution in dealing with companies skirting
the boundaries of criminal illegality.188 Such concerns are not
without foundation, as discussed in later parts of this piece.189 In
the particular case of assisting marijuana businesses, however,
I believe they are misplaced.
Lawyers who avoid assisting marijuana businesses solely
out of fear of adverse consequences are doing so neither out of
ethical concerns nor respect for the law. They are simply reacting, in a hyper-cautious way, to the complex and uncertain legal
183. Reinhart, supra note 23, at 5.
184. Id. at 5. It is worth noting that these warnings were made before the
Sessions statements that modified Cole Memo II. See supra notes 159–61 and
accompanying text.
185. Reinhart, supra note 23, at 9.
186. Id. (detailing further that if the fee is more than $10,000 and the lawyer
knows it came from a legal marijuana business, it may constitute a separate
money laundering crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2018)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1957
(2012).
187. Reinhart, supra note 23, at 8.
188. Indeed, it would seem that articles like Reinhart’s were intended to encourage precisely such lawyerly caution. Id. at 8–9 (detailing all the reasons not
to represent marijuana businesses).
189. See infra Part III.B.

2019]

LAWYER AS ACCOMPLICE

349

environment that currently constitutes regulation of the cannabis business. That complexity and uncertainty are not the result
of any conscious regulatory choices by political or judicial actors,
but stem from a series of compromises and contradictions engendered by: (1) local politicians ignoring difficult problems of federalism; (2) legislative gridlock at the federal level; (3) an increasing tendency of the federal executive to substitute
enforcement policies for legislative proposals; and (4) deep political divisions among Americans themselves.190 The results are
unfortunate for both cannabis businesses and the lawyers who
would like to represent them. Many such lawyers will decide the
risks are simply too great, thereby reducing the number of
skilled, talented, and ethical lawyers available to such businesses. This not only increases the cost of legal services to such
businesses but also makes it more likely many will be counseled
by unskilled lawyers, unethical lawyers, or by no lawyers at all.
Finally, the lawyers who do undertake such representation must
always operate under a cloud of uncertainty and unnecessary
risk created not by their own actions, but by the incoherence of
the regulatory environment in this field. This “debilitating instability and uncertainty”191 provides the strongest argument in favor of modifying or at least interpreting current ethical rules in
a way that clarifies lawyers’ obligations and reduces their risks.
B. THE DOWNSIDE OF DISRUPTION: UBER AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Uber is a spectacular financial success but a legal and ethical disaster. Until its recent initial public offering, it was considered the most valuable private start-up company in the world,192
having received proposals from Wall Street banks valuing it at
as much as $120 billion.193 At the same time, it is the subject of
190. Chemerinsky et al., supra note 143, at 77 (“The ongoing clash over marijuana laws raises questions of tension and cooperation between state and federal governments and forces policymakers and courts to address the preemptive
power of federal drug laws. Divergent federal and state laws also create debilitating instability and uncertainty on the ground in those states that are pioneering new approaches to marijuana control.”).
191. Id. at 77.
192. Nathan McAlone, How Uber Became the Most Valuable Startup in the
World, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.inc.com/business-insider/
how-uberbecame-the-most-valuable-startup-in-the-world.html [https://perma
.cc/44YT-RVLE]; Sara Ashley O’Brien, Uber Is the Most Valuable Startup in the
World, CNN MONEY (July 31, 2015), https://money.cnn.com/2015/07/31/
technology/uber-50-billion-valuation [https://perma.cc/AF9R-2MTH].
193. Liz Hoffman et al., Uber Proposals Value Company at $120 Billion in a
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at least five federal criminal investigations.194 Its founder and
CEO, Travis Kalanick, was forced to resign at the request of major investors.195 It has a problematic workplace culture that has
given rise to allegations of discrimination and sexual harassment.196 Some municipalities have passed legislation specifically
designed to limit further growth of Uber’s business,197 and commentators have called for regulators to dissolve the company,
citing, among other things, its “fundamental illegality.”198
There is no serious dispute that Uber’s business success is
based in substantial part on its violation of existing law. Although it styled itself as a technology company, Uber is basically
a private car service that allows pre-booking and the collection
of driver and customer information with a very sophisticated
app.199 Uber’s great competitive advantage, however, is that it

Possible IPO, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
uber-proposals-value-company-at-120-billion-in-a-possible-ipo-1539690343
[https://perma.cc/KT7G-ZQL8]. When the actual initial public offering took
place, Uber shares were priced to give a valuation of about $82.4 billion, which
was considered somewhat disappointing. Michael J. de la Merced & Kate Conger, Uber I.P.O. Values Ride-Hailing Giant at $82.4 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (May 9,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/09/technology/uber-ipo-stock-price
.html [https://perma.cc/5J7J-M3CC].
194. Eric Newcomer, Uber Pushed the Limits of the Law. Now Comes the
Reckoning, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
features/2017-10-11/uber-pushed-the-limits-of-the-law-now-comes-the
-reckoning [https://perma.cc/F8KD-TTSZ].
195. Mike Isaac, Uber Founder Travis Kalanick Resigns as C.E.O., N.Y.
TIMES (June 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/21/technology/uber
-ceo-travis-kalanick.html [https://perma.cc/W3TP-TTJK].
196. Mike Isaac, Inside Uber’s Aggressive, Unrestrained Workplace Culture,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/22/technology/
uber-workplace-culture.html [https://perma.cc/G5QB-RW8A].
197. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap as New York City Takes
Lead in Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
08/08/nyregion/uber-vote-city-council-cap.html [https://perma.cc/7ZX5-VQJ2].
198. Benjamin Edelman, Uber Can’t Be Fixed—It’s Time for Regulators to
Shut It Down, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jun. 21, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/uber
-cant-be-fixed-its-time-for-regulators-to-shut-it-down [https://perma.cc/W9SCCZQY]; see also Frank Pasquale & Siva Vaidhyanathan, Uber and the Lawlessness of ‘Sharing Economy’ Corporates, GUARDIAN (July 28, 2015), https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/28/uber-lawlessness-sharing
-economy-corporates-airbnb-google [https://perma.cc/W57Z-7EUW].
199. Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 385 (“Uber is essentially running a
taxi dispatch service for the smartphone age.”).
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chose not to comply with the costly regulatory structure that governed taxis and car services in most municipalities.200 By ignoring those regulations, Uber became the cheapest and most costeffective provider of ride services in the municipalities in which
it operated,201 despite its illegality.202
Uber’s basic business model certainly involved the deliberate violation of laws with criminal penalties.203 For some commentators, that fact alone, plus the harm it has caused to traditional taxi drivers, is enough to condemn it.204 Others, however,
point out that the regulatory structure that Uber is challenging
is itself subject to serious criticism as antiquated, inefficient, monopolistic, and designed to increase costs to consumers.205 This
was certainly the view that Uber’s management (and its lawyers) took.206 It is important to note that Uber was not breaking
the law merely to gain a cost advantage over competitors. It was
seeking to build a popular constituency for changes in the law,
200. Id. (“Uber and many other businesses are built around and based upon
a plan to change the law—and, in some instances, to simply break the law in
the meantime.”).
201. Edelman, supra note 198 (“With regular noncommercial cars, Uber and
its drivers avoided commercial insurance, commercial registration, commercial
plates, special driver’s licenses, background checks, rigorous commercial vehicle
inspections, and countless other expenses. With these savings, Uber seized a
huge cost advantage over taxis and traditional car services.”).
202. See infra notes 209–10 and accompanying text.
203. See, e.g., Complaint at 1–2, 8, City of Portland v. Uber, No. 14-cv-01958
(Or. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Uber Complaint] (seeking a declaration
that Uber was operating in “violation of the City of Portland’s Private For-Hire
Transportation Regulations and Administrative Rules” which among other
things, provided for criminal penalties of “a fine of $1,000 or imprisonment for
not more than six months or both”).
204. Thor Berger et al., Drivers of Disruption? Estimating the Uber Effect,
OXFORD MARTIN (Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/
downloads/academic/Uber_Drivers_of_Disruption.pdf [https://perma.cc/6HD2
-SMTG] (finding a mixed effect by Uber on employment by traditional taxi services, but that “it has reduced the earnings potential of incumbent drivers”);
Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are Struggling. So Are Uber
Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/
nyregion/uber-taxi-drivers-struggle.html [https://perma.cc/8LB8-6P65].
205. See Judd Cramer & Alan B. Krueger, Disruptive Change in the Taxi
Business: The Case of Uber, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 177, 181 (May 2016) (finding
greater efficiency of ride sharing services over conventional taxis attributable
to, inter alia, technological innovation and avoidance of outdated regulation);
see also Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 391 (explaining the ability of “regulator entrepreneurship” to combat laws whose costs exceed their benefits).
206. Newcomer, supra note 194.
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changes that it thought would be beneficial to consumers as well
as other private car services, although its own business was
likely to benefit most.207
Uber’s basic business model can be seen as posing an ethical
dilemma for its lawyers analogous, in certain ways, to that of the
cannabis lawyers. It involves deliberate conduct which clearly
violates laws containing criminal penalties, but there were good
reasons to believe those laws might be underenforced and potentially subject to modification in many municipalities.208 Indeed,
that had been the experience of Uber and other ride sharing companies. While some municipalities, like Portland, Oregon
strongly opposed their illegal operations,209 many others were
willing to negotiate modifications of their regulations that permitted Uber to operate legally.210 Accordingly, if we focus only
on the illegality of Uber’s basic ride-sharing business, a good
case can be made that the ethical rules pose unnecessary limits
on useful legal advice and unduly restrict potentially beneficial
legal change. Accordingly, as with cannabis, a case could be
made that Uber’s lawyers should be able to freely advise on the
company’s efforts to change its not-quite-legal activities to legal
ones.
But Uber’s basic business model should not be viewed in isolation. Something went badly wrong with Uber’s corporate culture, and its approach to law and law-breaking was an important
part of that failure.211 Uber’s deliberate violations of law were
not limited to the questionable municipal taxi regulations challenged by Uber’s basic business model.212 It extended to a great
deal of other illegal and frequently criminal activities which
were designed to give Uber further competitive advantages that
could not be justified under any reasonable concept of law reform.
207. Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 398–406.
208. Newcomer, supra note 194 (explaining that Uber management apparently took the position that they had tacit approval to operate anywhere the
existing regulations were not being “actively enforced”).
209. See Uber Complaint, supra note 203.
210. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 400–03 (referring to this power
as becoming “too big to ban”).
211. See Jennifer Hill, Legal Personhood and Liability for Flawed Corporate
Cultures (Sydney Law Sch., Research Paper No. 19/03, 2019), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=3309697 (follow “Open PDF in Browser”), for an insightful contemporary discussion of “toxic” corporate cultures and comparative legal responses to
them.
212. See infra notes 226–33 and accompanying text.
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Foremost among these unreasonable illegal advantages was
the “Greyball” program, which reportedly used “data collected
from the Uber app and other techniques to identify and circumvent officials who were trying to clamp down on the ride-hailing
service.”213 When Uber began operating in violation of existing
regulations, Greyball enabled Uber to identify enforcement officials who were seeking to verify and provide evidence of Uber’s
illegal operations.214 If the program determined the purported
customer was likely to be a government inspector, it sought to
avoid detection by: (1) telling that customer no cars were available; (2) scrambling “ghost cars” on the app; or (3) in cases where
the rider had already been picked up, instructing the driver to
terminate the ride immediately.215 The program was utilized
globally and was approved by Uber’s General Counsel.216 The
use of the Greyball program to evade governmental detection
may well have been a criminal violation in itself.217 The approval
given by Uber’s lawyers would have also constituted unethical
advice and assistance to Uber’s criminal conduct under Rule
1.2(d).
Attempting to evade detection by government authorities
undercuts the entire law reform rationale of Uber’s business
model. The effort at law reform is based on public demonstrations of the efficiency and convenience of Uber’s ride hailing service and the absence of the kinds of problems regulators feared
would result from the operation of such service without existing
administrative safeguards.218 Preventing government officials
213. Mike Isaac, How Uber Deceives the Authorities Worldwide, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/03/technology/uber-greyball
-program-evade-authorities.html [https://perma.cc/JZR8-Z5D2].
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Peter Henning, a law professor at Wayne State University, noted that
the Greyball program might violate the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012), or constitute “intentional obstruction of justice, depending on local laws and jurisdictions . . . .” Id. In 2017, the Department of Justice
apparently opened a criminal investigation concerning Greyball. Dan Levine &
Joseph Menn, Exclusive: Uber Faces Criminal Probe over Software Used to
Evade Authorities, REUTERS BUS. NEWS (May 4, 2017), https://www.reuters
.com/article/us-uber-tech-crime-exclusive/exclusive-uber-faces-criminal-probe
-over-software-used-to-evade-authorities-idUSKBN1802UI
[https://perma.cc/FPT5-54UL].
218. Isaac, supra note 213 (“The mayor of Portland, Ted Wheeler, said in a
statement, ‘I am very concerned that Uber may have purposefully worked to
thwart the city’s job to protect the public.’”).
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from observing that service and potentially misleading them
about its actual operations is inconsistent with such efforts.219 It
brings Uber counsel’s actions closer to those of the Global Witness and Panama Papers lawyers, helping a client evade detection of ongoing criminal conduct for the sole purpose of avoiding
criminal penalties.220
Greyball was bad enough, but Uber has been accused of a
number of other forms of criminal misconduct even more serious,
although less closely connected to its basic ride-hailing business.221 There has been general agreement that these problems
were primarily self-inflicted and stemmed from Uber’s seriously
toxic corporate culture.222 Even Dara Khosrowshahi, who became Uber’s CEO after Travis Kalanick’s departure, recognized
the serious problems, pledging to clean up Uber’s culture and
instill a new ethic of doing “the right thing.”223 Corporate culture
is not a topic that is frequently discussed by corporate lawyers

219. See, e.g., Levine & Menn, supra note 217.
220. Isaac, supra note 213; cf. Lipton & Creswell, supra note 134 (explaining
how lawyers encouraged the use of off-shore accounts and straw men to avoid
detection for tax fraud).
221. These include theft of intellectual property in connection with self-driving vehicles, violation of price transparency laws regarding its drivers, bribery
of foreign officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, using Greyball-like
programs to spy on drivers for competing companies, misleading consumers and
the FTC about its privacy and data security practices, and gender discrimination. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Uber Agrees to Expanded Settlement
with FTC Related to Privacy, Security Claims, (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www
.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2018/04/uber-agrees-expanded-settlementftc-related-privacy-security [https://perma.cc/R6GU-NAZM]; Greg Bensinger,
Uber Faces Federal Investigation Over Alleged Gender Discrimination: EEOC
Investigators Have Been Seeking Information Relating to Hiring Practices, Pay
Disparity and Other Matters, WALL STREET J. (July 16, 2018), https://www
.wsj.com/articles/uber-faces-federal-investigation-over-alleged-gender
-discrimination-1531753191 [https://perma.cc/9BF8-JEM9]; Ashlee Kieler,
Uber Facing at Least 5 Federal Investigations, Claims Report, CONSUMERIST
(Oct. 11, 2017), http://consumerist.com/2017/10/11/uber-facing-at-least-5-federal-investigation-claims-report [https://perma.cc/94CV-2K8M]; Newcomer, supra note 194.
222. Shannon Bond, Uber Chief Says Workplace Culture Needs Improvement, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/a247a728-d644
-11e8-a854-33d6f82e62f8.
223. Id.
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or legal academics,224 although it is a subject of substantial interest in business schools.225 One of the central features of Uber’s
corporate culture appears to have been a disregard for the law.
It is worth trying to figure out how Uber got that way.
Accounts indicate that Uber did not begin its operations
with a deliberate plan to violate municipal laws governing ride
hailing companies.226 Two of Uber’s competitors, Lyft and Sidecar, first began to operate in the San Francisco area without
complying with municipal laws.227 Kalanick spoke out publicly
condemning the conduct of his rivals as blatantly illegal.228
When authorities failed to shut those companies down, however,
Kalanick decided to adopt a similar business model.229 He sought
to rapidly expand Uber’s operations in any market where regulations against it did not appear to be strictly and vigorously enforced.230
In doing so, he sought the advice and assistance of his lawyers, who he pushed to be more “innovative” in a context in which
“innovation” was often code for breaking the law.231 The lawyers,
after a time, appeared to have embraced this analogy of law
breaking with technological innovation.232 They signed off on
Greyball and other legally questionable practices, moved employees engaged in questionable practices to jurisdictions where

224. See Donald C. Langevoort, Opening the Black Box of “Corporate Culture” in Law and Economics, 162 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 80, 81 (2006) (discussing how because there are two different theories about the role corporate
culture plays, neither party talks about it); see also Hill, supra note 211, at 3
(“Commentators have described the expression, ‘corporate culture’, as ‘inherently slippery.’”).
225. See, e.g., John R. Graham et al., Corporate Culture: Evidence from the
Field, 1–5 (unpublished paper for 27th Annual Conference on Financial Economics and Accounting Paper; Duke I&E Research Paper No. 2016-33; and Columbia Business School Research Paper No. 16-49) (2019), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2805602.
226. Edelman, supra note 198; Newcomer, supra note 194.
227. Edelman, supra note 198; Newcomer, supra note 194.
228. Edelman, supra note 198; Newcomer, supra note 194.
229. Edelman, supra note 198; Newcomer, supra note 194.
230. Edelman, supra note 198; Newcomer, supra note 194.
231. See Olga V. Mack & Katia Bloom, Embracing Risk: How Uber GC Salle
Yoo Defines Her Career, ABOVE L. (Sept. 19, 2016), https://abovethelaw.com/
2016/09/embracing-risk-how-uber-gc-salle-yoo-defines-her-career/
[https://perma.cc/JW3F-DCQN]; see also Newcomer, supra note 194.
232. Edelman, supra note 198; Newcomer, supra note 194.
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they were less likely to be arrested and prosecuted, and, consequently, were a major factor in fostering an attitude of disregard
for legal rules and legal limits within the company.233
We can see in the development of Uber’s “culture” the dangerous transition from lawyer-as-technician to lawyer-as-accomplice. The questions being asked of the lawyers had clearly
shifted substantially from “whether conduct was legal” to
“whether it was detectable” and “whether the company or its employees would be severely sanctioned for it.” We can also see a
clear and dangerous progression from the misdemeanor violations involved in operating an unlicensed taxi service to the
much more serious conduct which was the subject of the federal
investigations.234 It is unclear whether Uber’s lawyers actually
embraced this culture of law breaking as “innovation” or were
simply unable to resist or dissuade senior management from
pursuing it; it was probably a combination of both.235 What does
seem clear is that once the company began to violate the law,
neither its lawyers nor executives put forward any reasons to
stop. It appears they had no coherent legal or ethical basis for
distinguishing between violations that could be justified as legitimate law reform efforts and those that could not.
The Uber case can therefore justify either of two somewhat
contradictory conclusions: (1) that ethical rules like Rule 1.2 are
needed to prevent an inevitable deterioration in the lawyer’s role
from assisting minor lawbreaking to advising and approving
more serious forms of corporate criminal misconduct; or (2) that
by prohibiting all advice on activities that potentially carry criminal penalties, Rule 1.2 makes it difficult for lawyers to distinguish between potentially justifiable efforts at legal reform of inefficient or outdated laws and seriously criminal misconduct.
C. TRYING TO BE ACCOMMODATING: THE DILEMMAS OF AIRBNB
The business of Airbnb, the second most highly valued U.S.
private start-up,236 initially appears very similar to Uber. It too
operates a peer-to-peer internet platform from which consumers
233. Edelman, supra note 198; Newcomer, supra note 194.
234. See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text.
235. Cf. Newcomer, supra note 194 (“Kalanick . . . defined Uber’s culture by
hiring deputies who were, in many instances, either willing to push legal boundaries or look the other way.”).
236. Scott Austin et al., The Billion Dollar Startup Club, WALL STREET J.
(Feb. 18, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/graphics/billion-dollar-club/ (last updated
December 2018).

2019]

LAWYER AS ACCOMPLICE

357

can book short-term rentals in the homes of third party “hosts”
who list with Airbnb.237 Similar to Uber, many of these listings
are illegal because they violate various municipal regulations,
some with criminal penalties, that limit the rights of homeowners to offer such short-term rentals.238 Many of Airbnb’s hosts
are breaking the law, and Airbnb is clearly facilitating that lawbreaking.239 Yet unlike Uber, Airbnb has had a colorable argument that it is not liable in the United States for any such lawbreaking. That claim is primarily based on Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA).240 Section 230 “establish[es] broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that
would make service providers liable for information originating
with a third-party user of the service.’”241 Airbnb’s basic position
is that it is merely making available information originating
from third-party host users of the service, and the CDA renders
Airbnb immune from claims alleging the services offered by its
hosts are illegal, improper, or unsatisfactory.242 The scope of this
immunity is far from clear, and Airbnb takes a very expansive
view of its extent.243

237. Plaintiffs’ Joint Notice of Motion and Motion For Preliminary Injunction at 3, Airbnb v. City and Cty. of San Francisco (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2016) (No.
3:16-cv-03615-JD), 2016 WL 8808864 [hereinafter Airbnb Motion] (“Airbnb and
HomeAway provide Internet platforms through which persons desiring to book
accommodations (‘guests’) and those listing accommodations available for rental
(‘hosts’) can find each other, make arrangements, and enter into agreements for
rentals.”).
238. Memorandum from the Office of Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Att’y Gen.,
Airbnb in the City 8 (Oct. 2014), https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/AIRBNB%20REPORT
.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9FN-LA49] (stating that seventy-two percent of private
short-term rentals on Airbnb present an apparent violation of New York law).
239. Jana Kasperkevic, Airbnb Purged More than 1,000 New York Listings
to Rig Survey–Report, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/feb/10/airbnb-new-york-city-listings-purge-multiple
-apartment-listings [https://perma.cc/6CCD-PBD2] (“A report released by the
New York state attorney general’s office in October 2014 said that about 72% of
Airbnb’s listings potentially violated local laws . . . .”).
240. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2012).
241. Perfect 10 v. CCBill, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Zeran
v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)). Airbnb frequently quotes
this language in its litigation documents. See Airbnb Joint Motion, supra note
237, at 10, 12.
242. See Airbnb Motion, supra note 237, at 11 (“Courts have interpreted the
CDA to establish broad immunity for online providers . . . .”).
243. Edvard Pettersson & Olivia Zaleski, Airbnb May Be Its Own Worst Enemy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/
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Uncertainty regarding the scope of the immunity conferred
by the CDA means that Airbnb has at least a colorable claim that
its own activities are not illegal.244 This has enabled Airbnb’s
lawyers to advise and assist the company in its operations without serious concern that they are violating Rule 1.2. They seem
to have advised Airbnb to engage in an aggressive litigation campaign against local and state regulations. Such regulations,
many recently enacted, seek to enforce local laws against short
term rentals and impose new restrictions and reporting requirements on Airbnb.245
The fact that Airbnb’s basic business model does not violate
Rule 1.2 does not mean that its actions are ethical or socially
beneficial. There has been much debate on this question, starting with the undeniable proposition that Airbnb facilitates large
amounts of conduct by its hosts that do violate municipal laws.246
Critics have also made more debatable charges about the harm
Airbnb poses to neighborhoods, the tourism industry, and the
failure to vet hosts for unsafe conditions, criminal records, etc.247
Airbnb can credibly respond, however, that its services are extremely popular, both among renters and hosts, and offer many
homeowners the opportunity to earn extra income from their

new/articles/2018-09-13/airbnb-may-be-its-own-worst-enemy
[https://perma.cc/6528-8A4L].
244. See Airbnb Motion, supra note 237, at 11–13.
245. Id.
246. Airbnb’s position that such facilitation is not illegal, and that the CDA
protects it from aiding and abetting charges, is a defensible position legally, but
perhaps not morally. While the Airbnb website does provide some information
to potential hosts about the need to be aware of local regulations, What Regulations Apply to My City?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/961/what
-regulations-apply-to-my-city [https://perma.cc/RG8F-8Y8S], some hosts have
alleged that the information is insufficient and difficult to find. See Ron Lieber,
A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2012), https://www
.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-for-airbnb-hosts-who-may-be
-breaking-the-law.html [https://perma.cc/EX8G-U47P]; see also Autumn C.
Gear, Host at Your Own Risk: Monitoring the Legality of Airbnb Rentals at the
Platform Level, 12 (Spring 2016) (unpublished submission for the King Scholar
Program), https://www.law.msu.edu/king/2015-2016/Gear.pdf [https://perma
.cc/SS24-3BW5].
247. See Brittany McNamara, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13
COLO. TECH. L.J. 149, 156–59 (2016); see also Nicole Gelinas, Airbnb Is a Problem for Cities Like New York and San Francisco, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/06/16/san-francisco-and-new
-york-weigh-airbnbs-effect-on-rent/airbnb-is-a-problem-for-cities-like-new
-york-and-san-francisco [https://perma.cc/SRX7-LK8G].
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property.248 Many municipalities, prompted by the alleged
harms of Airbnb,249 have enacted regulations directed at Airbnb
and similar short-term rental platforms. Most either restrict
such companies from posting listings that fail to meet certain
requirements250 or require them to disclose certain information
about their hosts and rentals.251 Interestingly, no municipality,
in the United States or overseas, appears to have tried to prohibit Airbnb’s operations entirely.252
Nonetheless, such ordinances raise costs and constrain the
business operations of Airbnb. The company has embarked on a
long campaign of federal litigation against such ordinances,
claiming that they are preempted by the CDA, violate Airbnb’s
First Amendment rights, and other objections.253 In some cases,
Airbnb has succeeded in obtaining preliminary injunctive relief
against government enforcement.254 Longer term, however,
Airbnb appears to be losing, at least with respect to ordinances
that prohibit listing any rental by hosts who have not registered

248. Memorandum from Airbnb to the Fed. Trade Comm’n, Shared Opportunity: How Airbnb Benefits Communities, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/
documents/public_comments/2015/05/01740-96152.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W5MW-6UPN] (stating Airbnb’s position on the FTC’s investigation of the
“sharing” economy); see also, Josh Bivens, The Economic Costs and Benefits of
Airbnb, ECON. POL. INST. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.epi.org/files/pdf/157766
.pdf [https://perma.cc/ET4X-PXZE].
249. These regulatory changes also appear to have been influenced by extensive lobbying by the hotel industry. See Katie Brenner, Inside the Hotel Industry’s Plan to Combat Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes
.com/2017/04/16/technology/inside-the-hotel-industrys-plan-to-combat-airbnb
.html?partner=bloomberg [https://perma.cc/W4Q3-KAPU].
250. See, e.g., SAN FRANCISCO CITY ADMIN. CODE § 41A.5(e) (“[A]ny Hosting
Platform that provides a Booking Service for a Residential Unit to be used for
Tourist or Transient Use in violation of the Hosting Platform’s obligations under this Chapter 41A, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
251. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Local Law 2018/146, N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 26-2102(a)
(“A booking service shall periodically submit to the administering agency a report of transactions for which the booking service charged, collected or received
a fee . . . .”).
252. Katherine Lagrave, 13 Places Cracking Down on Airbnb, CONDÉ NAST
TRAVELER (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.cntraveler.com/galleries/2016-06-22/
places-with-strict-airbnb-laws [https://perma.cc/9VA4-ZCJD].
253. See Pettersson & Zaleski, supra note 243.
254. Benjamin Weiser & J. David Goodman, Judge Blocks New York City
Law Aimed at Curbing Airbnb Rentals, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www
.nytimes.com/2019/01/03/nyregion/nyc-airbnb-rentals.html
[https://perma.cc/QTD8-4XJ7].
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with local authorities. Its motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining a San Francisco ordinance to that effect was denied,255
and Airbnb’s challenge to a similar Santa Monica ordinance was
dismissed at the pleading stage.256 Accordingly, Airbnb has begun to face situations where the legal ambiguities have been
clarified and its former activities determined to be illegal.257
Airbnb has had to either comply with such municipal ordinances
or deliberately violate them.
While the evidence remains preliminary, Airbnb seems to
have followed its initial litigation with serious attempts at negotiation leading to substantial compliance. In San Francisco, it
had argued that enforcement of the ordinance would cause “substantial disruption to its business, and erosion of customer goodwill.”258 After losing its preliminary injunction motion, however,
Airbnb announced a settlement with the city that essentially
complied with the requirements of the ordinance.259 Airbnb appears reluctant to engage in the kind of blatant law-breaking
that would violate Rule 1.2. Even while challenging municipal
ordinances, it has generally sought, and rather successfully, federal court orders preliminarily enjoining municipalities from enforcing their ordinances during the pendency of its federal lawsuits.260 There do not appear to be any reported instances where
Airbnb has been ordered to cease and desist or been charged with
violations of such ordinances.261
To be sure, Airbnb has many good reasons not to deliberately violate municipal laws in addition to the potential ethical

255. Dan Levine & Heather Somerville, Judge Rejects Airbnb’s Bid to Halt
San Francisco Ordinance, REUTERS TECH. NEWS (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-airbnb-sanfrancisco-ruling/judge-rejects-airbnbs-bid-to
-halt-san-francisco-ordinance-idUSKBN1332OE
[https://perma.cc/X777-D8CN].
256. Airbnb v. City of Santa Monica, Nos: 2:16-cv-06641-0DW (AFM) & 2:16cv-08645-0DW (AFM), 2018 WL 3013245, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 14, 2018), aff’d,
918 F.3d 676 (9th Cir. 2019).
257. See supra notes 246–52 and accompanying text.
258. Plaintiffs’ Joint Motion, supra note 237, at 3.
259. Heather Somerville & Dan Levine, Airbnb, San Francisco Settle Lawsuit over Short-Term Rental Law, REUTERS BUS. NEWS (May 1, 2017), https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-airbnb-sanfrancisco-settle-lawsuit-over-short
-term-law-idUSKBN17X254 [https://perma.cc/9UGU-X6MQ].
260. See Weiser & Goodman, supra note 254.
261. Unlike Uber, which simply ignored such an order from the City of San
Francisco in 2010. Pollman, supra note 5, at 712–13.
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concerns of its lawyers. On the other hand, it has sufficient economic clout and enough popular support among hosts and
renters that its lawyers and management might well have contemplated a campaign of “corporate disobedience” to try to move
the law further in their favor. The fact that they have not engaged in this kind of campaign suggests that legality still counts
in the deliberations of the lawyers and management of some “disruptive” companies.
The three preceding case studies illustrate the complexities
involved in determining the appropriate ethical standards for
lawyers advising “disruptive” business. The dilemmas of cannabis lawyers provide an appealing case for loosening the strict
prohibitions of Rule 1.2. Yet the excesses of Uber and its descent
to blatant illegality provide a sobering warning against lawyers
condoning any form of criminal activity. Airbnb provides an intermediate case but also illustrates the need for greater clarity
and guidance for lawyers dealing with these issues. The final
section of this Article seeks to provide some such guidance.
III. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM AND A PROPOSED
SOLUTION
A. THE ISSUES AT STAKE
Part III draws on the previous history of corporate lawyers
and disruptive business case studies to further clarify the problem and suggest a path towards a possible solution. The disruptive industries discussed in Part II frequently operate in a recognizable zone of “not-quite-legal” conduct, in which their
activities go beyond the merely ambiguous to deliberate violations of law. Part II noted such conduct can be viewed as part of
a larger plan of law reform and frequently is so viewed by the
companies undertaking it. By creating consumer demand, conducting public relations campaigns, political lobbying, and strategic litigation, they seek to convert the not-quite-legal into the
fully legal.262 Advising these sorts of businesses not only creates
an ethical problem for corporate lawyers under the Rules of Professional Conduct, but it poses a genuine dilemma for any lawyer

262. See generally Pollman, supra note 5, at 712–13, 728–48 (describing
Uber’s strategy and the contexts in which companies push legal boundaries and
listing examples); Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 398–430 (describing how
such “regulatory entrepreneurs” create legal change, and the conditions that
cultivate this type of entrepreneurship).
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who identifies with and seeks to advance the goals of the company she advises, while also feeling both a professional and
moral obligation to advise and assist only corporate policies that
are justifiable under existing law. Accordingly, any proposed solution to the problem must involve more than just a change to
the Rules of Professional Conduct or the interpretation of those
rules. It must suggest a coherent ethical framework which can
justify some, but by no means all, the activities undertaken by
“disruptive” businesses and provide the ethically concerned corporate lawyer with guidelines for determining what types of notquite-legal corporate conduct can be ethically aided and justified.263
1. Not-Quite-Legal Corporate Conduct Is Extensive and
Expanding
Businesses such as cannabis, Uber, and Airbnb operate in a
legal environment I have referred to as “not-quite-legal.” By this
I mean something quite specific and somewhat different from ordinary legal uncertainty.264 The “not-quite-legal” is limited to situations where the actions contemplated or taken by the corporate client are very likely to be determined by competent
authorities to violate existing law,265 but where other objective
evidence creates a reasonable belief among knowledgeable observers that the laws currently prohibiting such conduct are
263. Given the disparities between the businesses discussed in the previous
section, one might reasonably ask why have a general set of guidelines for the
not-quite-legal? Why not decide on a case-by-case basis, as many state ethics
boards seem to be doing with cannabis businesses? The short answer is that
ethics rules are supposed to provide guidance for lawyers who are trying to conform their conduct to standards. To do that requires some broader set of ethical
guidelines that can be applied in many different contexts. See Pepper, supra
note 20, at 1609–10.
264. Pollman and Barry accurately note that disruptive businesses often
seek to take advantage of “legal grey areas” through conduct that is indistinguishable from “breaking the law.” Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 398–99.
Uber’s lawyers similarly failed to distinguish between conduct that was legally
innovative and conduct that was illegal. See supra notes 200–11 and accompanying text. Yet this distinction is ethically extremely important. Indeed, it is the
line between conduct currently permissible under Rule 1.2 and conduct which
is not. This section seeks to more carefully delineate that distinction by contrasting legally uncertain conduct with not-quite-legal conduct.
265. In this context, determination that an action is very likely to be a violation of law is to be based on a formal analysis of the content of the formal
statutes, case law and other authoritative legal rules (i.e., the “law on the
books”), without reference to likelihood of detection or enforcement.
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likely to be repealed or substantially modified in the foreseeable
future. This is the situation present with advising cannabis businesses. Although they are objectively in violation of federal law,
contradictory state laws and permissive federal enforcement policies have created a situation where, in fact, cannabis businesses
can operate relatively freely.266 The regulatory environments in
which Uber and Airbnb operate are in many respects analogous.
Many of the laws that they are violating are older, technical administrative regulations, usually promulgated at the local
level.267 These regulations are rarely or intermittently enforced,
potentially obsolete, and lack any significant public support beyond the specific commercial interests that benefit from them.268
As discussed in Part II, companies like Uber and Airbnb seek to
demonstrate the obsolescence and lack of support for such laws
by successfully operating in defiance of them, thereby creating a
constituency for their repeal or modification.
Businesses that deliberately operate in the zone of the “notquite-legal” are relatively new and conceptually distinguishable
from businesses that operate in areas of legal uncertainty. Business lawyers are used to dealing with situations where the controlling legal authorities are vague, ambiguous, or lack controlling legal authority.269 Acting in their “lawyer as technician”
mode, such lawyers have been willing to advise taking innovative legal approaches where such positions advance the client’s
goals. This is an approach implicitly endorsed by the Model
Rules.270 The “not-quite-legal,” however, goes a step beyond mere
legal uncertainty. With legal uncertainty, businesses take innovative actions they expect will be legally challenged and leave it
266. See supra text and accompanying notes 144–63.
267. See supra text and accompanying notes 221–33, 246–61.
268. See Alice Armitage et al., Design Thinking: The Answer to the Impasse
Between Innovation and Regulation, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 3, 19–22, 64 (discussing how innovative companies argue that old rules should not apply to them,
and the public pressures that regulators and certain private interests face as a
result of innovative companies); see also Pollman, supra note 5, at 733 (quoting
BRAD STONE, THE UPSTARTS: HOW UBER, AIRBNB, AND THE KILLER COMPANIES
OF THE NEW SILICON VALLEY ARE CHANGING THE WORLD 49 (2017)) (“In the
eyes of [Uber’s] co-founders, the app had the potential ‘to take on an entrenched
taxi industry that they felt was more interested in blocking competition than in
serving customers.”); Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 418–19, 441 (stating
that innovative companies are more likely to target less popular local laws, and
describing the concentrated benefits of zoning ordinances).
269. See supra notes 81–93 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
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to the courts to clarify and specify the scope of the ambiguous
legal rules. This notion of judges as legitimate lawmakers is now
well understood and accepted, reflecting the predominant legal
realist perspective.271 Executive detection and enforcement policies, unlike judicial interpretations, have generally not been
seen as part of the legitimate lawmaking function.272 A client
who acts aggressively for their own benefit in an area of legal
ambiguity is seen as taking a legal risk but not as deliberately
violating the law. In the not-quite-legal, however, the formal legal rule is clearly being violated. The uncertainty is whether the
executive will detect and seek sanctions for the legal violations.
Accordingly, advising clients to take actions that violate formal
legal rules based on executive policies of detection and enforcement create serious ethical issues for lawyers asked to give legal
advice.
Moreover, the zone of the “not-quite-legal” appears to be getting larger. In part this is the result of the well-known phenomenon of legislative gridlock, or the inability or unwillingness of
legislatures to promulgate effective rules to deal with new social
or economic developments.273 Such legislative inaction is often
attributed to extreme partisanship and interparty rancor.274 It
may also result, however, from: (1) lobbying by business or labor
groups that benefit from existing regulatory structures; or (2) a
lack of understanding of technological or social changes that
have rendered existing regulations outmoded.275 What is clear is
271. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND
PRACTICE 55 n.36 (1962) (stating that many important writings have discussed
the “judicial creation of law”).
272. See Cary Coglianese & Christopher S. Yoo, Introduction: The Bounds of
Executive Discretion in the Regulatory State, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1599
(2016) (“[S]ome scholars will no doubt still be inclined to argue that the President has no direct authority that can impose a duty to execute on the administration.”).
273. See generally Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of Gridlock, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2065, 2073–75 (2013) (exploring the causes of legislative action
rather than the absence of action in legislative gridlock).
274. Id.
275. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 249; Eric Evarts, Dealers Not Always
Plugged in About Electric Cars, Consumer Reports’ Study Reveals, CONSUMER
REP. (Apr. 22, 2014), https://www.consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/04/
dealers-not-always-plugged-in-about-electric-cars-secret-shopper-study
-reveals/index.htm [https://perma.cc/P38Q-92NA] (finding a lack of understanding among car dealerships of electric cars, and a correlating lack of encouragement for people to buy them); Cecilia Kang et al., Knowledge Gap Hinders Ability of Congress to Regulate Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://
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that more and more regulatory decisions have become, either deliberately or by default, executive decisions regarding enforcement.276 As the disparity between formal legal rules and enforcement policies grows, so does the zone of the not-quite-legal.
The other cause of growth of the not-quite-legal are the disruptive businesses themselves. By deliberately violating the
rules governing taxis or hotel accommodations, they force potential enforcers to adopt policies as to whether and how such regulations will be enforced, as well as the amount of wealth and energy that will be expended in such enforcement. The actions or
inactions of such governmental enforcers are likely again to reveal a gap between the formal legal rules and the policies regarding their enforcement, which expands the zone of the not-quitelegal.
2. Disruptive Industries Are Engaged in a Version of Law
Reform that Raises Unique Moral Issues
Companies like Uber and Airbnb are actively engaged in a
process of promoting legal change. Far from apologizing for promoting or actually committing deliberate violations of law, management of these companies see their actions as law reform efforts.277 They seek to demonstrate the obsolescence of existing
regulatory structures and build a public constituency in favor of
their modification or repeal.278 They may justify their law-breaking as a necessary evil, or as actions of no moral consequence
which have to be taken to achieve a greater good for the public.279
www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/business/congress-facebook-regulation.html
[https://perma.cc/TYQ2-YDXA]; Nicholas Vinocur, European Labor Wins Battle,
Not War, Against Uber, POLITICO (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.politico.eu/
article/uber-ecj-ruling-european-labor-wins-battle-not-war/
[https://perma.cc/34RE-F9P4].
276. See, e.g., Brendan Cheney, Manhattan DA Will No Longer Prosecute
Turnstile Jumping, POLITICO (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.politico.com/states/
new-york/city-hall/story/2018/02/01/manhattan-da-will-no-longer-prosecute
-turnstile-jumping-229568 [https://perma.cc/B2GR-DCRK]; Delahunty & Yoo,
supra note 122, at 787–92.
277. See Newcomer, supra note 194.
278. See, e.g., Uber Complaint, supra note 203, at 5–6; Airbnb Motion, supra
note 237, at 10.
279. See Pollman, supra note 5, at 713 (quoting Alex Davies, Travis
Kalanick’s Great Defender Writes a Hell of a Motivational Letter, WIRED (Aug.
30, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/uber-shervin-pishevar-kalanick-letter/
[https://perma.cc/KH8H-TAVT]) (“An Uber investor referred to the company’s
work as ‘a just cause’ and ‘one of the grandest business and moral battles of our
generation.’”); see also id. at 736 (quoting Sharon Driscoll, Lawyering at the
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This notion of violating the law in the pursuit of a greater good
invokes concepts of morally motivated civil disobedience that
may seem incongruous when applied to giant corporations pursuing profit-maximizing business ventures.280 Yet these companies are genuinely engaged in a version of law reform. In that
sense, their motives are also easily distinguishable from the clients in the Panama Papers or Global Witness situations, who
deliberately sought to violate the law without being detected but
were not seeking to change any laws.
Morally speaking, the actions of lawyers advising businesses acting in the zone of the not-quite-legal fall in an intermediate category: neither as admirable as those of the great civil
rights lawyers nor as bad as those who counseled the Panama
Papers and Global Witness clients. It is easy to imagine a lawyer
being genuinely perplexed by the moral dilemma of advising clients who propose to take actions that are not-quite-legal. Accordingly, it is worth examining in detail the differences between
these three different sorts of legally advised lawbreakers.
a. The Moral Contrasts Between Civil Disobedience and
Deceptive Criminality
The movement which led to the abolition of de jure racial
segregation in the United States and the passage of the 1964
Civil Rights Act was a combination of litigation, public demonstrations and protests, as well as public and private advocacy for
legislative change.281 Led in part by dedicated lawyers, one of its
main tactics was civil disobedience.282 Many of the actions of the
Edge of Innovation: A Conversation with Kent Walker, Google’s General Counsel
and Senior Vice President, STAN. LAWYER 27 (Nov. 9, 2016), https://law
.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/lawyering-at-the-edge-of-innovation-a
-conversation-with-kent-walker-googles-general-counsel-and-senior-vice
-president/ [https://perma.cc/RX37-BKSJ] (quoting Google’s general counsel,
who stated, “[o]ur rule of thumb has been if our products are creating value for
people and society, courts will usually come out on the side of delivering that
kind of benefit.”)).
280. See Caleb Pershan, Airbnb CEO Apologizes for Gandhi Comparison
Tweet, SFIST (Feb. 16, 2015), https://sfist.com/2015/02/16/airbnb_ceo_
apologizes_for_gandhi_co/ [https://perma.cc/46TM-UF64].
281. The role that law and lawyers played in the Civil Rights movement has
been a topic of great scholarly interest among lawyers, historians and others.
See Risa Goluboff, Lawyers, Law, and the New Civil Rights History, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 2312, 2314–17 (2013) (reviewing KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING
THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2002)), for a recent
overview.
282. Id. at 2317–21.
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early civil rights movement, the sit-ins, and lunch counter desegregations, were deliberate violations of Jim Crow laws.283 The
intentional flouting of such laws both demonstrated their moral
illegitimacy and helped to rally public support for their abolition.
It is important to note that such deliberate violations of law were
always carried out publicly and transparently, and the laws being violated were either morally wrong or facially neutral but
being applied in an unfair and morally illegitimate manner.284
In either event, the clear moral imperative to end racial segregation more than justified the violation of even neutral statutes
that were being used to interfere with that goal.285
The legal advice involved in the Panama Papers and Global
Witness situations provide a number of stark contrasts. One key
difference is the lack of transparency. Whereas the Civil Rights
movement disclosed and sought to publicize its violations of existing law, the primary advice being sought by the Panama Papers and Global Witness clients was how to avoid both public
disclosure and detection by government authorities.286 A central
goal of the Civil Rights movement was legal change. The goal of
the Global Witness and Panama Papers clients was not to
change existing law in any way but simply to realize personal
profits by avoiding taxes, laundering money, and violating other
283. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS, AMERICA IN THE KING
YEARS, 1954–63 (1988), for the most complete and comprehensive history of the
civil rights movement. See also; TAYLOR BRANCH, AT CANAAN’S EDGE, AMERICA
IN THE KING YEARS, 1965–68 (2006); TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE, AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963–65 (1998).
284. Examples in the latter category include restrictions on public gatherings, requirements for parade permits, and laws prohibiting disorderly conduct.
See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967) (affirming contempt
order issued against Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. and others for violating court’s
order by marching without a parade permit).
285. The civil rights movement, and the militancy that followed it, gave rise
to a vigorous debate in the legal and philosophical literature about the appropriate definition and limits of civil disobedience. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE, 363–68 (1971) (defining civil disobedience in a “nearly just” society as
“a public, nonviolent, conscientious political act contrary to law usually done
with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government.”). In support of this definition, Rawls cites, among other things, Martin
Luther King’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail.” Id.; see also Robert B. McKay,
Civil Disobedience: A New Credo?, 2 GA. L. REV. 16, 19 (1967) (“Civil disobedience is the violation of law by nonviolent means . . . .”); Delbert D. Smith, The
Legitimacy of Civil Disobedience as a Legal Concept, 36 FORDHAM L. REV. 707,
709–11 (1968) (discussing when civil disobedience may be considered justified).
286. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
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existing laws without detection or enforcement action being
taken against them.
Most importantly, the civil rights movement was a powerful
moral crusade. The undeniable justness of the goals was sufficient to justify the incidental and relatively minor concerns that
some laws, and even some morally neutral and justifiable laws
were sometimes being violated in the effort to achieve those
goals. In contrast, the law-breaking by the Panama Papers and
Global Witness clients lacked any independent moral justification whatsoever. The acts they sought to undertake were at best
morally neutral, like the nonpayment of taxes, or deeply morally
suspect, like facilitating the use and availability of funds derived
from organized criminal activities or governmental corruption.287 There is no “greater good” that can justify the violations
of law in such cases, only lesser and greater evils.288
b. Law Reform by Disruptive Businesses: An Intermediate
Moral Case
The law reform efforts of disruptive businesses are neither
as morally admirable as the Civil Rights movement nor as reprehensible as the actions of the Panama Papers and Global Witness clients. Unlike the latter, they are a genuine effort at law
reform. However, it is not directed at a high moral purpose but
rather at the more mundane but still respectable purpose of
maximizing profits for companies and their stakeholders. On the
question of transparency, the disruptive businesses discussed in
Part II have taken a substantial divergence of approaches.
Airbnb seems fairly committed to a policy of full disclosure about
its operations as part of its ongoing litigation campaign against
laws which it believes illegally interfere with those operations.289
287. See Donaldson, supra note 135, at 379.
288. Even representing and advising clients who are engaged in morally justifiable civil disobedience may create dangers for contemporary lawyers. See
American Bar Assn., How to Advise Clients on Civil Disobedience, ABA NEWS
(Nov. 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/
2018/november-2018/consider-this-advice-before-adding-civil-disobedience
-defense-to/ [https://perma.cc/7GHB-LMDD].
289. See, e.g., Complaint of Airbnb, Inc. for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
at 5–9, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Boston, 386 F.Supp.3d 113 (D. Mass. 2019) (No.
1:18-cv-12358), 2018 WL 5923843 (discussing its operations relating to how
Airbnb collects fees and protects users’ privacy); Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 9–13, Airbnb, Inc. v. City of New York, 373 F.Supp.3d 467
(S.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 1:18-cv-07712) (describing the process guests use to sign
into Airbnb’s website and how hosts create a listing).
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It also makes active efforts to inform its hosts about the legality
of short-term rentals in their area and to negotiate openly with
regulators to reduce restrictions on its hosts whenever possible.290 Uber, in contrast, has in some instances concealed aspects
of its operations and actively sought to thwart governmental detection and enforcement efforts, most notably through the “Greyball” software.291
Disruptive businesses have justifications for their legal violations, but they are not primarily moral ones. They are arguments about public policy and social benefit, with some libertarian concerns about promoting consumer choice and individual
freedom to engage in entrepreneurial activity thrown into the
mix.292 These industries argue that they provide services that
customers want in a more efficient, convenient, and less expensive form than traditional taxis, hotels, etc.293 They attack the
regulatory structures they are violating, often with some justification, for being a means of protecting existing market participants by raising barriers to entry, increasing costs to consumers,
and stifling innovation.294
Such considerations raise substantial ethical questions for
conscientious lawyers. Since they represent these clients, they
are likely to agree with the basic policy arguments that underlie
their law reform efforts. They may well believe that the world
will be a better place if existing laws are changed to permit their
businesses to operate freely. This does not mean, however, that
they are or should be comfortable counseling their clients to
break the law. This is not only a violation of Model Rule 1.2, but
290. See supra notes 246–47, 259 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 213–16, 225–33 and accompanying text.
292. See Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 398–410, 427–28.
293. See, e.g., Jonathan V. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, An Analysis of the Labor
Market for Uber’s Driver-Partners in the United States 25 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section, Working Paper No. 587, 2015), https://dataspace
.princeton.edu/jspui/bitstream/88435/dsp010z708z67d/5/587.pdf [https://perma
.cc/9Z7R-EBZJ] (“[T]he availability of modern technology, like the Uber app,
provides many advantages and lower prices for consumers compared with the
traditional taxi cab dispatch system, and this has boosted demand for ride services . . . .”); McNamara, supra note 247.
294. See Randall Stross, Why Companies like Uber Get Away with Bad Behavior, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/
opinion/travis-kalanick-uber-bad-behavior.html [https://perma.cc/NWX3
-LD7U] (quoting a report co-authored by Eric Holder recommending that Uber
change official “core values” such as “Always Be Hustlin’” that were “used to
justify poor behavior”); supra note 279 and accompanying text.
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of the moral principle that stands behind it—that deliberate violation of criminal law is inherently wrong, and lawyers should
never facilitate or aid their clients in violating such laws.295 Inherent in this rule is the moral principle that adherence to the
law is itself a moral virtue, and disobedience, a moral failing.296
If one accepts the basic principle that it is wrong to violate
criminal law, at least without a morally justifiable reason, then
counseling disruptive businesses to violate such laws raises difficult and complex issues. On the one hand, the laws being violated rarely have strong moral content.297 Yet the justifications
for their violation are also largely matters of efficiency and convenience rather than morality.298 When, if ever, can such considerations justify deliberate acts of criminal conduct, even of a
mild, non-violent sort, and when, if ever, can lawyers provide advice that aids and abets such behavior?
B. SHOULD LAWYERS ADVISE CLIENTS WHO SEEK TO VIOLATE
CRIMINAL LAWS FOR PROFIT?
While the prohibitory language of Rule 1.2(d) seems absolute, its underlying justification is ambiguous. The prohibition
on advising against conduct that is “criminal or fraudulent” is
itself a compromise of sorts, in that it implicitly permits lawyers
to counsel their clients regarding conduct that is tortious,
breaches contracts, or otherwise violates civil law.299 In that
sense, it is hardly a strong ethical prohibition against all forms
of law breaking.300 Yet the basic idea that lawyers should not
295. This principle is analyzed in greater detail infra Part III.B.
296. This does not mean that all criminal law-breaking is always morally
wrong. Although Model Rule 1.2 seems to present this principle in absolute
terms, I suspect that most lawyers, when thinking about all the laws that carry
criminal penalties, and all the possible reasons for violating them, would take a
somewhat more relativistic view. While violating a criminal statute is always
morally problematic, such actions can be justified when there are strong moral
reasons to do so, and the law being violated does not prohibit inherently immoral conduct. Violating a traffic law to bring a sick child to the hospital would
be one clear example. The civil rights movement’s acts of civil disobedience are
another.
297. See discussion supra Part II.
298. See supra note 104.
299. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016); see also
Pepper, supra note 20, at 1588–89; supra notes 8–14, 20 and accompanying text.
300. The predecessor to Model Rule 1.2(d), N. Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013), stated that a lawyer
could not “[c]ounsel or assist the client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be

2019]

LAWYER AS ACCOMPLICE

371

help their clients break the law, especially criminal law, unless
they have a very good reason to do so, still seems like a fairly
sensible and useful standard of conduct for most lawyers in most
situations.
Nonetheless, there are situations in which most would agree
that lawyers are justified in helping their clients violate the
law,301 but is the desire to help clients make money one of them?
Many commentators assume not, telling lawyers, for example, of
the ethical and financial dangers of representing cannabis businesses.302 Others have argued that the deliberate and persistent
law-breaking activities of Uber or Airbnb’s effective encouragement of law-breaking by its hosts make them morally suspect.303
It cannot be denied that these companies have engaged in morally questionable behavior, much of which was directly related
to their efforts to conceal or minimize law-breaking by them or
their affiliates.
Nonetheless, when we consider the whole panoply of businesses that are or might be involved in conduct that enters the
zone of the not-quite-legal, how strong is the argument that lawyers should never advise such clients on matters like enforcement policies or provide any other form of legal assistance, but
should merely tell such clients that their contemplated activities
violate criminal law and then politely show them the door?
illegal or fraudulent.” See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text discussing
the Canons’ prohibition on counseling violations of “statute law.”
301. See discussion supra Part III.A.2.
302. See supra notes 165–66 and accompanying text.
303. See, e.g., First Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 60, La Park La Brea
A LLC v. Airbnb, Inc., 285 F. Supp. 3d 1097 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (No. 2:17-cv-04885)
(alleging that “Airbnb fails to warn guests that they may be booking an apartment that is being sublet without the apartment owner’s permission, even when
Airbnb is aware that the apartment owner has refused to provide permission to
the subletting activity and knows that the short-term rental violates the host’s
lease agreement and is unlawful.”); Hannah Lownsbrough, Uber’s Practices Are
Morally Unacceptable—But a Boycott Won’t Help, GUARDIAN (July 13, 2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/13/uber-practices
-company-london-consumer-sumofus [https://perma.cc/JB6F-TK45] (discussing
Uber’s treatment of drivers and its response to employee sexual harassment
complaints); Carolyn Said, Airbnb Rentals Prompt Eviction in San Francisco,
SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.seattletimes.com/life/travel/airbnb
-rentals-prompt-eviction-in-san-francisco/ [https://perma.cc/2WA5-V95Z] (quoting a San Francisco-based tenant’s attorney, who stated “[my clients] thought
it was OK to rent out on Airbnb because the company didn’t tell them otherwise.
Airbnb should be defending these tenants, or they should disclose to every person who rents in San Francisco that (short-term rentals are illegal) and tenants
are being evicted”).
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Should the limited exceptions some states and ethics committees
have recognized for cannabis businesses be extended more generally to permit advising companies that seek to operate in the
zone of the not-quite-legal? The issue is a complex one, with substantial arguments on both sides.
1. Effect on Public Perceptions of Law, the Legal Profession,
and Corporate Lawyers
Allaying negative perceptions of the bar and of corporate
lawyers has been a primary motivating factor in the development of ethical codes.304 The notion that rich corporations with
high-priced lawyers can get away with actions that ordinary people cannot has been a common belief among populists of both the
left and right.305 It also undercuts the public’s respect for law
itself.306 Rule 1.2(d) can be seen as a formal rejection of that popular perception. Accordingly, it is reasonable to worry that any
weakening of its prohibition would confirm critics’ worst suspicions, that corporate lawyers give only lip service to the concept
of “rule of law,” and that their real job is helping corporate clients
do whatever they please. It is especially troubling since this negative perception comes uncomfortably close to describing the actual role of many corporate lawyers in their lawyer-as-technician
mode.307
Yet this concern is not necessarily a dispositive reason to
reject any modifications of Rule 1.2. First, it is unlikely that
these negative perceptions of law and lawyers are affected very
much by the language of ethics codes. Rather, they are a result
304. See supra notes 77–80, 115–17 and accompanying text.
305. See Brandon L. Garrett, The Corporate Criminal as Scapegoat, 101 VA.
L. REV. 1789, 1791 (2015) (demonstrating, with supportive data, the difficulty
of prosecuting corporate employees in part because of large scale white collar
defense resources, and noting that, in these cases “[p]rosecutors typically obtained light sentences and experienced quite high numbers of outright losses in
the form of acquittals and dismissals”); Robert M. Palumbos, Within Each Lawyer’s Conscience a Touchstone: Law, Morality, and Attorney Civil Disobedience,
153 U. PA. L. REV. 1057, 1077–78 (2005) (discussing the double standard for
judging attorney civil disobedience); France, supra note 22, at 70 (“In a wide
variety of settings that go well beyond the tax world, attorneys are essentially
empowered to give business customers something very valuable: a get-out-ofjail-free card.”).
306. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble ¶ 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2018) (“A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a representative of
clients, an officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice.”).
307. See supra Part I.B.
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of actions actually taken by corporations with the advice and
sanction of their attorneys. Reports of blatantly illegal and socially harmful conduct by companies like Uber and Airbnb are
hardly improved by noting that, in advising on such conduct,
their lawyers violated the ethics rules.308 It is quite possible that
a more nuanced ethical rule recognizing certain exceptions to the
general prohibitions might actually provide more effective and
realistic guidance to real corporate lawyers, and in so doing, help
them deter their clients from some of the more egregious instances of corporate misconduct.
Second, the concept of “law” in Rule 1.2 could be more expansively interpreted to include government policies regarding
enforcement as well as formal legal rules. In this way, the prohibition of Rule 1.2 against advising with respect to criminal activity can be preserved, but a broader discussion can be permitted
of activities that are not-quite-legal, and in certain situations, it
might be concluded that some such activities do not fall within
the prohibition of Rule 1.2.
Corporate lawyers already advise clients in situations where
the law is vague or ambiguous.309 Litigators have even greater
leeway.310 State bar ethics committees have expanded the advice-giving function for cannabis clients to include advice regarding enforcement policies.311 It may well be that an expanded concept of what constitutes legal advice would permit conscientious
corporate lawyers to provide not-quite-legal businesses with advice regarding matters that could reasonably be considered “legal” in light of enforcement policies and the likelihood of sanctions, while also permitting them to provide ordinary corporate
law services.
2. Providing Not-Quite-Legal Businesses with Competent and
Ethically Informed Counsel
The strongest argument for modifying the existing prohibition of Rule 1.2 is that it is not preventing many businesses from
breaking the law, but it may well be preventing them from obtaining the best legal advice and services from competent and
ethically informed counsel. Given the powerful first-mover advantages of operating in areas that are not-quite-legal, it is likely
308.
309.
310.
311.

See discussion supra Parts II.B–C.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2016).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
See supra notes 180–87 and accompanying text.
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that such strategies will continue to attract many start-up companies and budding entrepreneurs.312 This certainly seems to be
the case with cannabis, and the enormous financial success of
Uber and Airbnb makes it likely that their business models will
also have many imitators. If so, the current absolute prohibition
may well be self-defeating, leaving such companies to operate
with less competent or experienced lawyers, or with those who
have no compunction against operating outside legal or ethical
norms.
Rule 1.2(d) prohibits counsel from providing even ordinary
transactional lawyering services to businesses operating in the
zone of the not-quite-legal.313 This prohibition is hard to justify
for businesses that are hardly traditional criminal enterprises.
While it is likely that such companies will always manage to find
some lawyer willing to draft contracts for them, set up corporate
subsidiaries and limited liability companies, etc., the ethical restrictions of Rule 1.2 will likely reduce the number of lawyers
they can choose from and probably eliminate some of the most
experienced and competent. Similarly, the most ethically conscientious lawyers, and perhaps the most risk averse, will be the
ones unable or unwilling to compete for the business of such companies.314
Of course, clients organizing disruptive businesses will
likely seek not only ordinary legal services, but also advice about
their planned law-breaking activities, including advice on enforcement, detection, and potential sanctions. Uber provides a
disturbing example of what can happen when corporate lawyers
see themselves as promoting “disruption” and acting beyond traditional legal or moral norms.315 Would it not be better to expand
the boundaries of ethically permissible advice-giving so that lawyers and companies who seek their advice are operating under
coherent and reasonably well-defined ethical principles? One argument for expanding the kinds of legal advice that lawyers can
312. See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
313. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (stating a lawyer may not
“assist” a client’s criminal conduct). This would prohibit providing any legal services to, for example, a cannabis business. See Reinhardt, supra note 23, at 8–9
(“The lawyer sits in a different position once the legal services go beyond giving
advice and begin assisting with transactions that help the business operate. At
that point, the lawyer arguably becomes an aider and abettor of an illegal drug
enterprise.”).
314. See supra notes 183–89 and accompanying text.
315. See supra Part II.B.
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ethically give regarding potential law-breaking conduct is that it
provides an opportunity to create a more realistic and nuanced
standard of ethical conduct for lawyers advising such clients,
and thereby avoid the worst excesses of the “disruptive” mindset.
The counterargument to this rosy scenario is that we need
more and stronger prohibitions, both on illegal activities and the
lawyers who abet and condone them.316 Such a view rejects the
assumption that current ethics rules can have no effect on businesses that seek to operate in an expanding zone of the not-quitelegal.317 It seeks to shut down not-quite-legal businesses or, at
the very least, reduce their profitability through greater enforcement of both the criminal laws companies violate and the ethical
rules that lawyers ignore.318 While recognizing the powerful incentives companies have to engage in not-quite-legal conduct,
proponents of this view are likely to point out that no criminal
law is ever completely effective and that the goal is to reduce
such corporate misconduct, not encourage it by permitting lawyers to help make it more effective.319
3. Interference with the Legislative Process and Executive
Enforcement of the Law
Are the efforts of businesses to reform the law by disregarding existing rules a social harm or a social benefit? Once again,
reasonable minds can differ, both in general and in specific
cases.320 Disruptive businesses interfere with ordinary governmental decision-making processes by creating new businesses,
new constituencies of consumers, and new workers before governmental authorities have had a chance to fully study the issues or consider the effects on all relevant parties.321 This can be
viewed as manipulative, antidemocratic, and violative of the fundamental normative principle that lawmakers and executive
branch law enforcement should make their decisions based on a
disinterested concern for the best interests of the public. The
316. The Global Witness and Panama Papers controversies have given
added force to this argument. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
318. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. See generally Reinhart,
supra note 23 (discussing the criminal laws a marijuana business violates and
the ethical rules a lawyer implicates when assisting these businesses).
319. See Pollman, supra note 5, at 724–28 (discussing varying scholarly
viewpoints on corporate law breaking).
320. See id.
321. See supra Part II.

376

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[104:309

counterargument is that such attempts at law reform through
creation of new businesses are no worse than the older, common
corporate tactic of influencing lawmakers through lobbying,
campaign contributions, and other methods. Indeed, one benefit
of the new law reform strategies is that operating a business,
even a somewhat illegal one, must be done mostly in public to
generate consumer demand, unlike lobbying and campaign practices that take place mostly behind closed doors.322 The counterargument is that creating new consumer demand does not replace lobbying and other strategies for influencing government
decision-making, but simply makes them more effective. It is
also more clearly illegal than lobbying or campaign contributions.323
4. The Immorality of Breaking the Law
The previous arguments in Part III were all consequentialist. They sought to consider the likely results of a change in existing prohibitions on advising law-breaking clients and tried to
ascertain whether those results would, on balance, be socially
harmful or beneficial. Yet Rule 1.2 can also be seen as reflecting
a deontological position that violating the law is itself a moral
wrong. People, and corporations, should obey the law for the
same reason they should tell the truth and be kind to others;
because it is the right thing to do. This does not mean that people
should never break the law. There are sometimes good moral
grounds for breaking the law,324 just as there are sometimes good
moral grounds for lying or being unkind to certain other people.
But they must be moral reasons, not mere concerns for personal
benefit. Anyone who lies or is unkind to others merely to obtain
a personal benefit is a jerk. Similarly, any person or corporation
who violates existing laws just to increase profits or market
share is acting in an immoral manner.
There is no clear-cut refutation of this sort of argument,
whose strength depends largely on acceptance of its premises.
One could argue that there is no inherent moral value in a rule
merely because it has been validly enacted by the relevant governmental authorities.325 Rather, all such rules should be judged
by their own inherent moral content and can be good, bad, or
322. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
323. See supra Part II.
324. See supra notes 291–96 and accompanying text.
325. This comes close to the more instrumentalist legal realist positions. See
supra notes 84–89 and accompanying text.
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morally indifferent. In this view, there is no moral obligation to
obey mere “technical” rules about licensing, regulation of certain
industries, or prohibitions on enjoyable and potentially useful
products like cannabis.326 Rather, an expanded version of the “efficient breach” concept should be applied so that companies that
will benefit from violating such rules and are willing to risk the
penalties involved should be free to do so.
A second, and to my mind somewhat weaker justification, is
that disruptive businesses are engaged in morally justifiable activities that can overcome objections to their law-breaking. Acceptance of this argument depends on how much moral content
one is willing to ascribe to greater convenience, lower prices for
consumers, or greater job opportunities for those seeking parttime work. While it is highly doubtful that such benefits can justify the kinds of egregious corporate wrongdoing engaged in by
Uber, there may well be specific companies, like medical marijuana businesses, that can credibly argue that their businesses
have positive moral content which justifies the relatively minor
legal violations involved.
I have purposely presented these arguments for and against
modification of Rule 1.2 in a tentative “on the one hand, on the
other” style, rather than the more confident, result-oriented arguments that characterize most legal briefs and many law review articles. This is in part because I believe that discussions of
legal ethics should recognize the difficulties of making generalized moral judgments under conditions of uncertainty, and because I believe that on this particular issue, there are substantial arguments for both sides. But the main reason for noting the
strengths of both sides’ arguments is to suggest that the best response to this problem is a compromise of sorts. I suggest a limited and highly conditional expansion of the kinds of advice authorized by ethical rules to permit discussion and assistance of
some not-quite-legal activities. This would avoid the worst effects of the current prohibition while maintaining some moral
focus and impose reasonable ethical limits on the kinds of aid
and advice that can be given to companies that seek to break the
law. That is the goal of the next and final section.

326. In many ways, this argument reflects the traditional criminal law distinction between offenses that are malum prohibitum and those that are malum
in se, a distinction which itself is falling out of favor with criminal law academics. See Richard L. Gray, Eliminating the (Absurd) Distinction Between Malum
In Se and Malum Prohibitum Crimes, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1369, 1370–72 (1995).
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C. A NEW PROPOSED STANDARD
Ideally, a modification of Rule 1.2 would expand the concepts of “law” and “legal advice” to permit lawyers to aid and advise businesses regarding activities that have obtained some degree of public acceptance but still remain within the zone of the
not-quite-legal. At the same time, to maintain respect for the law
and integrity of legal practice, any such rule should also set relatively clear and morally justifiable limits on the kinds of notquite-legal activities on which lawyers can ethically aid and advise. I believe this can be done with a new standard that (1) permits lawyers to aid their clients and advise them on activities
which currently violate formal legal rules, but for which there is
a reasonable basis for believing they will become legal in the
foreseeable future. Such aid and advice can only be extended to
such activities, however, if they are also (2) fully disclosed, and
no attempts are made to prevent governmental authorities from
detecting or observing them, and (3) the lawyers have reasonable, independent grounds for concluding that the activities are
not otherwise unethical or harmful to the public. Although this
new standard could be the basis for a revision of Rule 1.2 or its
equivalents in various state ethics codes, it is also possible, and
probably preferable, to add it as a commentary or advisory opinion to the existing rule, as some states have already done in connection with advising cannabis clients.327
1. Expanding Permissible Subjects for Legal Aid and Advice
Current ethical rules forbid advising or assisting a client “in
conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.”328 Note
that if the lawyer does not “know” the planned conduct is criminal, but thinks it merely might be because the authorities are
vague, conflicting, or confusing, the rules do not forbid advising
and assisting on such matters.329 In effect, the zone of permissible advice-giving is expanded under the current Model Rules to
include not just clearly legal conduct, but conduct that might be
legal under a reasonable interpretation of the existing rules.
Certain other legal rules extend the zone of permissible legal discourse even further. Most notably, Rule 11(b)(2) of the Federal
327. An advisory opinion would not be binding on courts, see supra note 181,
but would provide for a longer, more reasoned discussion of the issues involved,
and would likely be persuasive to lawyers and governmental authorities, while
also leaving room for exceptions and special cases.
328. See supra note 8.
329. See supra note 8.
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Rules of Civil Procedure extends the realm of permissible legal
argument in civil lawsuits not just to arguments warranted by
existing law, but to any “nonfrivolous argument for extending,
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new
law.”330 In short, what constitutes “the law” for lawyers varies
from discourse to discourse and for various purposes. Litigators
have more leeway than corporate legal advisors, who probably
have more leeway than, say, treatise writers.331
When does a lawyer “know” that contemplated client conduct is criminal? Certainly not when it is merely uncertain or
ambiguously legal. What if, as with cannabis businesses, the
conduct violates federal law, but is permitted by state law, and
there are objective indications that the federal authorities are
disinclined to enforce federal law in areas where it conflicts with
state law? As discussed, state ethics boards have been willing to
extend the zone of permissible advice-giving to such clients, permitting lawyers to do ordinary corporate work for them as well
as advise them about current governmental enforcement policies.332 What about businesses that are contemplating other conduct, like operating an unlicensed ride sharing service, where
such conduct would violate express licensing requirements carrying criminal penalties, but where other companies have engaged in such activities in recent years and no governmental action has been taken against them? I would argue that such
conduct can also be characterized as within a new expanded zone
of legal ambiguity, and lawyers should therefore be permitted,
under some circumstances, to aid and advise such businesses as
well.333
I would generalize this rule as follows: Lawyers may advise
or assist clients with respect to conduct that may appear possibly
criminal, if objective evidence creates a reasonable belief that
such conduct is likely to be permitted in the foreseeable future.334 This rule attempts to define the zone of the not-quite330. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
r. 3.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
331. Legal advisors can offer their clients innovative or idiosyncratic interpretations of uncertain legal rules. See supra notes 85–89 and accompanying
text. Treatise writers can, at best, acknowledge such views with a “but see” citation.
332. See supra notes 173–81 and accompanying text.
333. This would permit assisting with much but not all of the conduct of
Uber, Airbnb, and other disruptive businesses. See supra Parts II.B–C.
334. This change would leave the prohibition in Rule 1.2 on advising or assisting “fraudulent” conduct unaffected.
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legal and to extend permissible aid and advice-giving to that
zone. It recognizes the importance of legal advice to clients engaged in law reform efforts, as many disruptive businesses claim
to be, but only permits such advice when there is objective evidence that such law reforms are “likely to be successful” in the
“foreseeable future.” The requirement of “reasonable belief”
based on “objective evidence” is important. It makes it clear that
aid and advice does not extend to any corporate law-breaking
which the client hopes might someday be legalized, but only to
situations where “objective evidence” shows some public ambivalence, governmental ambivalence, or uncertainty about continuing regulation or enforcement of the law. State laws legalizing
cannabis sales would certainly constitute such evidence, but so
would policies of nonenforcement or underenforcement of regulations governing specific businesses like car services or shortterm rentals. Trends in the law, like an announced policy of nonenforcement in other cities or states, might also constitute such
objective evidence of likely legal change. In that sense, a business might be able to demonstrate its entitlement to legal advice
and aid by the success of its own prior law reform efforts or those
of its competitors. By emphasizing objective evidence of likely
legal change, however, I hope to preserve the current rule’s attempt to demonstrate respect for law and the obligation of lawyers to act within the bounds of the law. The revised rule should
not be seen as sanctioning law-breaking, but rather as recognizing and expanding the zone of legal uncertainty and ambiguity,
where clients perhaps most need legal advice and assistance.335
Lawyers should have no difficulty providing standard contract drafting, tax advice, and other ordinary legal services to
clients whose conduct meet the requirements of the expanded
rule. With respect to giving advice regarding conduct that violates existing law, lawyers can certainly advise about the formal
law itself, potential sanctions, and enforcement policies. They
can also discuss other objective evidence of likely legal change.
Because of the need to uphold the basic principle of lawyers’ commitment to the rule of law, however, such discussions should not
extend to methods for avoiding detection of conduct that violates
the law.

335. It is important to remember that the revised rule would not legalize any
such conduct but would simply permit lawyers to provide advice as to all aspects
of its present or future legality.
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2. Conduct Must Be Fully Disclosed and Observable
Having expanded the kinds of conduct for which clients can
seek aid and advice, it is equally important to set clear and morally justified limits on such conduct. Some corporate cultures,
having defined themselves as disruptive law-breakers, show a
greater willingness to jettison all kinds of constraints on other
harmful and morally questionable behavior.336 Accordingly, any
expansion of the aiding and advice-giving function must also include strict limits on extending those functions to conduct inconsistent with a basic commitment to the rule of law. Uber clearly
crossed that line with the “Greyball” project, which sought not to
challenge existing law, but to evade it.337 Full disclosure of potentially illegal conduct was also a feature that distinguished legitimate civil disobedience from seedy tax avoidance and money
laundering schemes.338 Assistance and advice-giving, therefore,
must be limited to conduct which is fully disclosed and observable by the public and government officials. It may not be extended to conduct which seeks to avoid detection by such authorities. Similarly, ethical lawyers can give no advice on how to
avoid such detection.
To a certain extent, this rule will be self-enforcing with respect to startup businesses, since every company which seeks to
sell goods or services to the public must provide a fair amount of
truthful information about its operations.339 There will, however,
be some line-drawing issues. The rule against concealing notquite-legal conduct should not be used to impose a full-scale securities disclosure regime on privately held businesses. There is
no need to disclose all material information about a company,
just about activities that arguably violate criminal laws. Information about the activities need not be filed with governmental
authorities on some kind of disclosure form so long as they are
publicly observable by any governmental authority that wants
to observe them.340 Lawyers would be ethically prohibited from
336. See supra Part II.B.
337. See supra notes 213–16 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 281–86 and accompanying text.
339. Moreover, in their law reform efforts, companies often seek to “make an
issue as publicly salient as possible” in order to “rally the public to their cause.”
Pollman & Barry, supra note 5, at 387.
340. Since the governmental resources devoted to enforcement is one of the
criteria for determining whether an activity is a likely subject for law reform,
the rules should not make it unusually easy to detect and punish such violations.
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providing any advice or assistance regarding potential corporate
criminal activities that were not disclosed in this manner. This
does not mean, however, that such lawyers would have to disclose such conduct to the authorities. Ordinary attorney-client
principles remain in effect, which require such disclosure of prospective criminal conduct only in limited circumstances.341
This unwaivable requirement of full disclosure should enable lawyers to draw a clear distinction between clients engaged
in some version of law reform, even a self-interested one, and
clients seeking to simply enrich themselves by gaming the legal
system. By denying legal advice and assistance to the latter, ethically conscientious lawyers will still be affirming a coherent vision of the rule of law.
3. Proposed Activities Must Not Be Harmful or Otherwise
Immoral
Deliberately breaking the law is a morally serious matter
that should not be undertaken without strong justification. Accordingly, any standard that permits lawyers to assist and give
advice to clients in connection with potentially law-breaking activities should also require them to make reasonable efforts to
determine that the corporate activities involved are moral, or at
least not socially harmful or otherwise morally unjustifiable. Legal assistance should not be given to companies that cannot
make such a showing about their own conduct.
Standards for judging whether conduct is socially harmful
or immoral are numerous and often contradictory, particularly
for businesses, and especially start-up businesses.342 Much will
depend on one’s views concerning the morality of promoting free
choice, consumer protection versus efficiency and cost reduction,
increased competition and promotion of innovation, related matters like environmental protection, the welfare of employees or
of independent contractors, and promotion of diversity and antidiscrimination. Consequently, it would be surprising if most corporate lawyers could not find ways to conclude that the activities
of their clients were, in most instances, socially beneficial or at
least morally neutral. Their clients would certainly agree, even
if others with different perspectives might not. It would therefore seem that such a requirement is unlikely to prevent much
legal assistance or advice.
341. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018).
342. See supra notes 104–21 and accompanying text.
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With respect to the vast majority of business clients who are
organized as corporations or other business entities, however, it
is possible for lawyers to require a somewhat more objective
manifestation of the morality of their clients’ conduct. They can
advise and assist with law-breaking activities only after they
have received a determination that such proposed conduct is not
harmful or otherwise immoral from an independent committee
of a client’s board.343
The use of independent committees to monitor and review
controversial or questionable corporate actions is a common and
generally well-regarded aspect of modern corporate practice.344
It is seen as providing both a formal check and an alternative
perspective on managerial actions that might subject the company to potential liability.345 At the very least, it creates a reporting requirement to board members for decisions which cannot or should not be taken by incumbent management alone by
requiring them to be considered by a committee whose interests
are not too closely tied to management’s. In a well-functioning
company, such committees will approve most managerial decisions, but this is not a foregone conclusion.346 Moreover, the very
prospect of independent committee review may deter management from taking actions that are questionable or difficult to justify.347

343. A similar obligation for approval by independent advisors can be placed
on LLCs and other noncorporate business entities.
344. See Corporate Laws Committee, ABA Section of Business Law, Corporate Director’s Guidebook—Sixth Edition, 66 BUS. L. 975, 1013–15 (2011); Peter
J. Henning, Board Dysfunction: Dealing with the Threat of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 585, 585–86 (2008) (discussing corporate board responses to the threat of liability, including internal investigations and special
committees).
345. See Frank Aquila & Samantha Lipton, Making Good Use of Special
Committees, PRACTICAL L.J., Oct. 2010, at 44, https://www.sullcrom.com/
siteFiles/Publications/Aquila_Lipton_Oct_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/77JP
-KSDF] (“The formation of a special committee tends to reduce the criticism and
litigation that naturally results from transactions in which the target’s entire
board may not be viewed as disinterested and independent.”); see also Henning
supra note 344.
346. See Aquila & Lipton supra note 345, at 46 (“A special committee should
be empowered to act on behalf of the corporation independently of the interested
directors or any controlling stockholder.”).
347. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 § 301
(2002) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) (outlining
the requirements for an independent audit committee).
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A requirement of independent committee review of the morality of any corporate actions that are not-quite-legal would
serve both practical and expressive functions. It would provide a
review of the morality of proposed managerial conduct at a high
level by sympathetic but independent observers. At best, it
might deter some of the overreaching and misconduct observed
with companies like Uber. It would also give ethically conscientious lawyers additional assurance that the morality of their client’s conduct has been considered at the highest levels. Finally,
it would demonstrate to the business world at large, and disruptive industries in particular, that even when stretching the
boundaries of the law is possible and profitable, such conduct
raises serious moral issues that are not to be taken lightly.
CONCLUSION
Ethical rules should provide guidance to conscientious lawyers, not merely seek to constrain their most egregious conduct.
This Article has shown the need for such guidance for lawyers
facing the complex dilemmas of modern corporate practice. That
need is particularly great for lawyers advising companies in disruptive, rapidly changing business and regulatory environments. The modest changes to the ethics standards proposed
here seek to balance the needs of lawyers and their clients with
a commitment to innovation and beneficial law reform, while
also trying to avoid the dangers of advice that goes beyond the
formal limits of the law. It also recognizes that a lawyer’s most
fundamental commitment must be to the values embodied in the
concept of the rule of law.

